

KOHLBERG AND MORAL EDUCATION:

A MORE COMPREHENSIVE OUTLOOK

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ABSTRACT

KOHLBERG AND MORAL EDUCATION: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE OUTLOOK

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This study contains an exegesis of a theory of moral development the author believes to be biased against the non-cognitive features of moral behavior. The main proponent of this "biased" cognitive developmental theory is Lawrence Kohlberg who continued and expanded the work of Jean Piaget in this field. The study explores the theory of Kohlberg with the intention of redressing the balance between the emphasis on the cognitive components and the non-cognitive components of moral education.

As shown in the works of such men as Richard Peters, William Frankena, John Wilson, and Martin Hoffman, such non-cognitive features as content, habit, emotion and feeling also play an important role in moral functioning.

The different components were found to be supportive, not detrimental to each other. They involve more than just parallel processes. They involve processes so interlocking and permeating, that success with one component was dependent upon success with another.

The study recommends that schools adopt a curriculum not based solely on one theory, one in which a student's emotional well-being is considered as important a goal as his intellectual advancement. In an atmosphere where the development of the whole organism is considered, cognitive growth and non-cognitive growth can foster and promote each other simultaneously, the end product being a more well-balanced moral individual.

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Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the cognitive approach to moral and ethical development as exemplified primarily by Lawrence Kohlberg. After an exegesis of his cognitive theory and its implications for moral education, this study will emphasize the shortcomings that flow from a theory whose conception is singularly cognitive, by taking up the works of such people as William Frankena, John Wilson and Richard Peters. The paper will question the adequacy of any theory which views morals as solely cognitive in nature and will argue for the redressing of the balance between cognitive and non-cognitive components in moral education.

Education needs guidance in the sphere of moral education and it naturally will look to moral theory. Moral theory, therefore, and the applications to education which stem from it, must be examined quite closely.

Traditional Institutions

Traditional institutions supporting the moral code are in a weakened position. The modern North American family is smaller, more fragmented and often has both parents away from home for the major part of the day to work. A second traditional institution that has lost impact on moral development is the church. Church attendance has dropped markedly,

resulting in the church's loss of influence and teaching authority.¹ There is a general concern about the deterioration of personal relationships and the incidence of violence and aggression in our society. The violent, anti-social behavior of the streets is reflected in the violent material shown on movie and television screens. The public has finally begun to express its impatience with the failure of educationists to provide any remedy, and is asking for solutions.

An active, successful program of moral education in school is needed in addition to the efforts of family and church. One way or another moral education does and will go on continually in our schools. It is an inescapable fact that we as educators are moral educators. It is an unavoidable responsibility. For the teacher is in quite a powerful position, and, unknowingly or not, will have an immense impact upon the moral lives of his students.

Morality is embedded in all formal education. The experience of schooling changes all children, some for the better, some unhappily. Often the changes are hardly the ones planned by the teacher or even apparent to him. Nonetheless, teachers must carry a major burden along with the family in helping children to meet and deal justly with moral problems.²

¹"Religion in America", Gallop Poll Index 1975.

²Nancy F. Sizer and Theodore R. Sizer, eds., Moral Education: Five Lectures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 3.

The five authors of the essays given as a lecture series at the Harvard Graduate School of Education in the spring of 1968 left us with the prevailing impression that for any school-teacher who reads the essays the attempt to teach morality must be made by teachers and soon. The essays gave many reasons pointing to the complexity and difficulty of "teaching" morality but one point the authors all agreed upon was that it must be taught none the less.

There is no such thing as a "morality free" school or "valueless" teaching. Any interpersonal experience contains a moral element and the classroom is no exception.

Every society wants to initiate its young into its own cultural conventions, on the tacit assumption that it is not only necessary for the continuance of society, but for the well being of the newcomer as well. This job of socialization is given, in a large part, to the school, where they attempt, directly or indirectly, to supply their students with an adequate apprenticeship to adult life. The school is an institution with a basic function of maintaining and transmitting some, but not all of the consensual values of society. Public education is committed to the transmission of the most fundamental values of our society. Special insights into, and understandings of, the complex dimensions of moral education and theory are needed to help us see the direction we want the development of ethics and morals to take in our schools.

Cognitivists' Position

One major response to the need for guidance in moral theory stems from the work in cognitive development first of Jean Piaget, and later of Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget and Kohlberg based their cognitive developmental approach on John Dewey's distinction of customary and reflective morals.³ The approach is called cognitive because it has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child about moral issues and decisions. It is called developmental because it views the aims of education as movement through moral stages. Dewey theoretically postulated three levels of moral development which were later built upon by Piaget and later still by Kohlberg.

The exploratory work was done by Jean Piaget, first on general conceptual development and later on moral judgment. It was Piaget who made the first effort to define stages of moral reasoning in children on the basis of data gathered from a small number of children on their understanding of rules. Piaget defined three stages of moral reasoning. The first is actually a premoral stage where there is no sense of obligation to rules at all. Next comes the heteronomous stage alternatively called moral realism or a morality of constraint. Piaget views this stage as the product of two interacting factors: cognitive immaturity and unilateral

³Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," in Moral Education, ed. by David Purpel and Kevin Ryan (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p.176.

emotional respect for adults. At this stage, the child accepts with little critical reflection, the standards of his social group. He externalizes moral rules to the extent of making them unchangeable absolutes rather than as flexible instruments of human values and purposes. The third level is the autonomous level or a morality of co-operation where individual thinking allows one to judge for himself whether a purpose is good or not, regardless of what the group standards are. At this level there is a system of modifiable rules expressing common rights and obligations among equals.

To exemplify these stages we will look at one of Piaget's stories.

Once there was a camp for Boy Scouts (Girl Scouts). Each one had to do his bit to help with the work and leave things tidy. One had to do the shopping, another brought in wood or swept the floor. One day there was no bread and the one who did the shopping had already gone. So the scout master asked one of the Scouts who had already done his job to go and fetch the bread. What did he do?⁴

The child in the stage of the morality of constraint would be likely to say that the boy should obey the command. Because of his unilateral respect for adult authority he believes one should obey someone in a superior position. A child at this stage would also believe that the unfortunate child who accidentally cuts a large hole in her dress deserves a far harsher punishment than the one who cut a small hole in

⁴Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 277.

her dress.

A child in a later stage would react differently to the scoutmaster. He would resent being asked to do that which someone else was to have done. He has started to understand one's role in a social network and believes in a morality of equality: If he does to choose to obey, it will be a choice freely made. He may see the command as unfair but choose to obey for other reasons. The child at this later developmental stage can consider numerous factors simultaneously (i.e. intentions of the wrong doer). The child may obey the scoutmaster out of concern for doing something nice, but not out of unquestioning obedience to an authority. At the autonomous level rules are viewed as changeable depending upon reciprocal respect and co-operation.

In 1955 Kohlberg started to redefine and validate the Dewey-Piaget levels. For twelve years Kohlberg and his colleagues studied the same group of 75 boys, following their development at three-year intervals from early adolescence through young manhood. In addition Kohlberg explored moral development in other cultures—Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey.

Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget's pioneering effort to supply a structural approach to moral development. He elaborated, over the years of his study, a typological scheme describing general structures and forms of moral thought which can be defined, Kohlberg believes, independently of the specific content of particular moral decisions or actions.

The typology contains Piaget's three distinct levels of moral thinking confirmed by his cross-cultural investigations, and within each of these levels Kohlberg distinguishes two related stages. Kohlberg suggests that these levels and stages be considered separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the socio-moral world, all based on the one universal virtue—justice.

Kohlberg has suggested a new approach to the study of morality which he feels avoids the morass of semantical confusions, value-bias and cultural relativity in which the psychoanalytic and semantic approaches to morality have floundered. He focuses upon structures, forms and relationships that he feels are common to all societies and all languages rather than upon the features that make particular languages or cultures different.

Criticism of Kohlberg's Approach

Kohlberg's key argument is that the child's level of moral development is anchored to his level of cognitive functioning, and thus, development of the cognitive is focused upon and emphasized. Some critics, who have been expressing dissatisfaction with our present traditional system, complain that it emphasizes the cognitive development commitments at the expense of the "non-rational" aspects of personal growth. Joseph Junell suggests that such a curriculum is not only inadequate but harmful as well. He poses the question, "To what part of man does public education owe its first obligation? Is it to his intellectual-academic world, or his

emotional-social one?"⁵

This quote leads to my claim that any singularly cognitive approach, such as Kohlberg's, calls for a certain amount of criticism. Junell goes on to explain that there is a certain amount of naiveté involved in beliefs that propose that it is "reason" which truly civilizes power or that "irrational motivations" are best corrected by exposing them to reason. Such faith in the powers of the mind also leads people to believe that man's irrational component is actually destructive in nature and that the reasoning process can best be trained to function without the influences of the senses and emotions.

Critics of these proponents of rationalism share a common point—"an emphasis upon reason at the expense of other human faculties is damaging to man.....Mental life is more like a co-operative venture in which success is possible only by a joint effort of all the faculties."⁶ An element of moderation should be applied when speaking of the exalted position of the cognitive.

To Kohlberg, the essential ingredient of moral development is a certain mode of reasoning and judgement. All forms of moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg, are products of particular cognitive structures. It is the emphasis on this overriding criterion which causes certain defects in

⁵Joseph Junell, "Is Rational Man our First Priority?" in Conflicting Conceptions of Curriculum, ed. by Eliot Eisner and Elizabeth Vallance (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 176.

⁶John Kekes, A Theory of Rationality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), p. 171.

in Kohlberg's theory. For example, one fact Kohlberg seems to ignore is that preceding the development of rational thought is a

gradual accumulation of preferences, compulsions, and rejection which eventually form our life style.....casting over our lives an invisible screen of primary dispositions, and tendencies to behavior through which each of our thoughts is sifted and by which the very quality of our thinking is in large part determined.⁷

One point this study will attempt to make is that emotionally-linked attitudes function in such a way that they can either liberate or imprison the child's imagination and rational thinking and that they too need to be one of the primary targets of public education.

Kohlberg ignores any evidence of man's emotionally dominated rational processes and insists that the specific quality of any affective state is determined by its cognitive housing and therefore the emphasis needs to be on the development of that cognitive structure.

Kohlberg's theory has a lot to offer moral educators but its shortcomings are too important to be overlooked. His theory, after all, is in fact only one moral theory and by pointing to some of its inadequacies I hope to verify the need to at least study some possible alternatives and to make room for alterations.

As already noted, Kohlberg is particularly weak

⁷John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health, Geneva: World Health Organization, Monograph Series No. 2, 1951), quoted in J. Junell, op.cit., p. 108.

on the development of the affective side of morality, of moral emotions such as "guilt", "concern for others", etc. He opposes what he terms "irrational emotive theories" and does not bother to clarify what role affect or emotion is to play.

There are other omissions for which Kohlberg and the proponents of his theory do not seem to be able to produce a good enough account. Based upon an overgeneralization from the Hartshorne-May studies conducted in the late 1920's showing honesty to be situation-specific, Kohlberg dismisses a whole class of character traits that are not situation-specific and of relevance to a "rational morality". This is a very restricted outlook towards character traits dependant upon the peculiarities of a particular class of character traits. But Richard Peters elaborates distinct classes of virtues, ignored by Kohlberg, which are very pertinent to moral development. One's "bag of virtues" does not have to be as conceptually crude as the one Kohlberg presents in his argument.

Through his dismissal of the part character traits can play in moral development, Kohlberg also throws out the window any significant role habit, or habit formation, is to have in morality, without giving any evidence that this should be the case. He makes references to ego strength, sees the importance of will, but offers no account of the type of habit training which encourages its growth. One premise of this paper is that it is possible, and advantageous, as well, for a rational morality to develop from a basis provided by early

habit formation. Learning habits in an intelligent way can help a child to become sensitive to considerations which will later serve him as principles. Acquiring habits at an early stage can develop into a more rational way of following rules. It can pave the way for principled morality.

Also in his dismissal of character traits and habit, Kohlberg disregards the importance of content in moral education. The content of a person's beliefs and life experiences is indispensable to constructing a profile of the total moral personality. This study will attempt to show that reasoning in morality is not the kind of activity in which one learns the process independently of content. Before children can grasp principles they need to learn situation-specific rules of behavior covering a wide range of cases. They need to learn the particulars on which the generalizations can stand. And long before children reach the age of reason where they can understand the validity of rules, a set of rules needs to be set down for them, for their sakes as well as others. The moral life must have content as well as procedural principles for reasoning about what one is to do, be, or think.

Kohlberg views his Kantian principled view of morality to be the only true one with no place for alternative types. Yet his is a very limited interpretation and not only is there a need, but the author hopes to show there is also the room, for adjustments to be made within the framework of Kohlberg's conception of moral development.

Noncognitivist Position

Many feel we need to expand beyond the rather narrow academic channelling of our present school system and do more to offset the dominating intellectual emphasis in educational practice. G. H. Bantock argues that, "we are always being told that the function of our education is to make children think.....It is equally necessary to teach children how to feel; for some such feelings are as important a way of taking the world, as apprehensions of aspects of reality, as are our cognitions."⁸ Because of this, Bantock seems to fear that the twentieth-century mind is happier with, and better able to cope with, facts and theories than with feelings and personal commitments.

The balance seen in teacher training portrays a definite lack of effective instruction in the development of non-cognitive components, as opposed to the training available for the cognitive aspects such as learning to question, to analyze, and to form complex rules and principles. This study, in its final part, will show why this inequity occurred and what might be done to help correct it. Geoffrey Yarlott remarks that, "it is a remarkable omission in the light of how much a child's behavior is influenced by emotion."⁹ The 'omission' has in part been due, not to an original lack or neglect of non-cognitive

⁸G. H. Bantock, Education, Culture and the Emotions (London: Faber, 1967) p. 129.

⁹Geoffrey Yarlott, Education and Children's Emotions: an Introduction (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 4.

objectives, but to the apparent fact that "it has been easier to teach and evaluate cognitive objectives."¹⁰

Any effort to find out which is more quantitatively influential in moral development and judgement, cognitions or affects, has or will, fail. They cannot be viewed as separate entities, as I will attempt to demonstrate. Any attempt to do so would create a certain artificiality.

There has always been an "indomitable faith in the powers of the mind to solve any or all problems."¹¹ As a response to that, this paper will, without trying to discredit the need for reason, nor to elevate the position of such non-rational influences as emotions,¹² identify the aspects of non-cognitive development which are amenable to educational influence and to show how they can be fostered in the classroom. We strive for the education of the 'whole person', not just his intellect.

To recapitulate, in chapter one of this study, we will take a closer look at Kohlberg's theory—how it evolved and the nature of his educational efforts. His approach represents a departure from such previous works which viewed moral development as the accumulation of a collection of virtues or as the progressive conformity to the norms set down

¹⁰D. Krathwohl, B. Bloom, B. Masia, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966), p. 16.

¹¹J. Junell, p. 107.

¹²Ibid., p. 109.

by a society. We will study his moral stages and their implications. We will see what such a theory implies for a curriculum of moral education.

In chapter two, the study expands on what the author believes to be the shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory and its repercussions in practical application. The paper argues that Kohlberg's account of moral development should be considered rather one-sided since it has been erected on the features of a limited interpretation of morality. Peters, in "A Plea for Pluralism", verbalizes this belief when he claims that there are certain phenomena existing in moral development which cannot be explained in terms of a Kohlberg or Piaget type of theory, and we should look to our alternatives for a much needed supplement to the work of the Piaget-Kohlberg school.¹³

In essence, the competencies associated with Kohlberg's highest stage of reasoning are the ability and the disposition to make one's moral judgements in accordance with the principles of justice for persons. Although these are necessary features of moral maturity, the danger is that they may come to be regarded as the only competencies necessary for rational morality and this study hopes to show that this clearly is not the case. What Kohlberg refers to as moral maturity is a concern for developing only one crucial component of moral competence. Kohlberg discards the practice of teaching and enforcing specific rules of behavior as irrelevant. He objects to focussing upon the development of character traits because it would prove unprofitable. He

¹³Richard Peters, "Moral Development—A Plea for Pluralism," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 266.

doesn't believe there are such things as moral virtues so any such approach could not work. He ignores the powerful role affective components play and he deems fruitless the value habit training can be to the formation of a principled morality.

Chapter two aims to show that his reasons for abandoning such features of moral education are not defensible.

Not only are these elements compatible with, but apparently necessary to, his theory of stimulating moral development through cognitive stimulation. What the paper calls for is a more comprehensive account of moral competence.

Chapter three is devoted to showing how an expanded approach encompassing some alternative emphases can be used to create a more positive atmosphere for successful moral education.

CHAPTER I

The Cognitive Viewpoint on Moral EducationBackground of Kohlberg's Theory

This section will first look at what preceded and led to Kohlberg's theory of cognitive development. His approach actually grew out of his lack of acceptance of what he takes to be previous theory. The paper will then study what Kohlberg offers as a substitute and alternative theory. We will examine the kind of research he undertook, and the conclusions he made from it, such as the discovery of a six-stage moral sequence. The study then investigates Kohlberg's stance on how moral growth and development actually do occur what he considers the role of such non-cognitive factors as affect, and finally, how his theory can be successfully incorporated into an educational curriculum.

According to the traditional cognitivist, any failure in the program of moral education is due to a gross underestimation of the difficulty of moral problems and analysis. The cognitivist feels the foundations of ethics, as well as everyday moral reasoning (done within the framework of ethics), are matters for reason to investigate and establish—and that reason, in fact, shows ethics to have solid bases. Traditional cognitivists give some support to the Platonic belief in the power of the rational good. Plato believed that if we were to

know with perfect clarity what the nature of the moral end is, we would inevitably pursue it. In other words, he who knows the good chooses the good.¹

According to Kohlberg, Aristotle claims that we obtain moral virtues as a result of habit. We become just by doing just acts, brave by doing brave acts, etc. Therefore, Aristotle saw learning by doing as the only real method in the moral sphere. Kohlberg feels it is this type of 'boy scout' approach to moral education which has dominated North American practices in this field in the past. Moral character was divided up into lists of vices and virtues. An early study of moral character done in the late twenties by Hartshorne and May,² manifested a bag of virtues consisting of honesty, service, and self-control. A more recent major study by Havighurst and Taba,³ added responsibility, friendliness and moral courage to that bag. Aristotle's original bag included the virtues of temperance, liberality, pride, good temper, truthfulness, and justice. And the Boy Scouts' bag contains honesty, loyalty, reverence, cleanliness and bravery.

How, exactly, was the 'bag of virtues' approach supposed to work? It was a character-building program. Moral character consisted of a list of virtues and vices. Given a

¹See Plato: Republic 475 A-E VI 485 C-E.

²H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, Studies in the Nature of Character (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

³R. J. Havighurst and H. Taba, Adolescent Character and Personality (New York: Wiley, 1967).

bag of virtues the children were urged to practice them. Daily opportunities were supposed to be given so this 'learning by doing' could occur. Adults were to act as living examples of the virtues. The children were to be told that if they lived up to these ideals, happiness, fortune, and good repute were to follow. The theory was that doing daily chores would lead to responsibility, the opportunity to give to the Red Cross would lead to altruism, etc.

Kohlberg feels that the bag of virtues approach was attractive to moral educationalists, because it let them assume that everyone could be a moral educator. As long as they were an adult and respectable, and knew what virtues were to be in the bag, they were considered qualified to teach since they would be able to set a good example.

Kohlberg dismisses this approach as inadequate because he feels it did not lead to any improvement in moral character. Why, in Kohlberg's opinion, didn't this approach work? His objection to this desirable trait ideology, is that there is no such thing as a bag of virtues. Everyone has their own bag. Even if the same virtue could be included in everyone's moral bag, definitions of the virtue would differ. Kohlberg argues, "Virtues and vices are labels by which people award praise or blame to others, but the ways people use praise and blame toward others, are not the ways in which they think when making decisions themselves. You or I may not find a Hell's Angel truly honest, but he may find himself so."⁴

⁴Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern

Kohlberg does not believe that a person's moral bag will turn out to be a bag of governing standards. He uses the Hartshorne and May study as an example.⁵ This classic study was a monumental character education inquiry. Hartshorne and May carefully studied the behavior of 11,000 children who were given opportunities to lie, cheat or steal in various activities—classroom work, home duties, party games and athletic contests. To qualify as an acceptable test, the situation had to tempt the child to do something for personal gain that he would not want others to know about. The studies showed the inconsistency of children to be amazing. It was impossible to predict if a child who cheated on a math test would also cheat on a spelling test. Cheating, therefore, was found to be situation-specific. If you cheat in one situation, it does not mean you will or you won't in another. Also, what you verbally say about honesty has little to do with how you act. Even if you cheat, you might express just as much disapproval, or even more, as someone who doesn't. Kohlberg believes that since more recent research also indicates that variations in situations produce variations in moral behavior, this is even more evidence against the benefits of any character building program.⁶

Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education: Five Lectures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 63.

⁵Hartshorne and May.

⁶L. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 60.

Not only does Kohlberg criticize the bag of virtues approach on the grounds that there are no such things, but that if there were it is not clear how to teach them or even who should. As Kohlberg notes, Socrates himself questions "whether good men have known how to hand on to someone else the goodness that is in themselves." Socrates observed that good fathers don't necessarily have good sons, or qualify as teachers of virtues, and goes on to give examples of one virtuous Greek leader after another who had non-virtuous sons. Kohlberg attempted to validate this Socratic viewpoint. He took what he believes to be a valid measure of moral maturity, (discussed more fully, later in the chapter) and gave it to a group of middle class men in their twenties and also to their fathers. He found no correlation between the two—the morally mature father was no more likely to have a morally mature son than was a father low on moral development.⁷

Kohlberg's Alternative Theory

Kohlberg's criticisms of what he takes to be the traditional basis for moral development has led him to abandon any attempt to define moral virtue at the individual level, which is what he feels the bag of virtues approach attempted to do. He claims that virtue is ultimately one, not many, and no matter what culture we are in, this ideal form will be the same. This ideal form is justice and he claims it should be the central moral value of the school as well as of that of

⁷Hartshorne and May.

society. He substitutes a new theory then, based on what he believes to be the concept of justice in the Platonic sense. In other words, what makes a virtuous action virtuous is that it is guided by knowledge of the good. A seemingly courageous act based on ignorance of danger is not courageous. Nor is a seemingly just act, based on ignorance of justice, to be considered just. By justice, Kohlberg means;

not a rule or set of rules, but a moral principle. By a moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing we want all people to adopt always in all situations.....There are exceptions to rules [to kill Hitler would have been right because respect for the equal values of lives called for his death in order to save lives but no exceptions to principles.] A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the right or claim of another person. A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims.... There is only one principled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality.....A moral principle is not only a role of action, but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called respect for persons.⁸

Kohlberg believes that because morally mature people are governed by the principle of justice rather than a set of rules, there are not many moral virtues, but one. He concludes that "the most essential structure of morality is the principle of justice and the core of justice is the distribution of rights and duties regulated by concepts of equality and reciprocity."⁹

⁸L. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," pp. 69-70.

⁹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), p. 40.

Using the concept of morality in which justice is central as the terminus of moral development, Kohlberg sought in his practical research to determine the regularities, or patterns of development of individuals, toward that endpoint. Kohlberg, like Piaget, did not concentrate on moral behavior or on what the individual actually does. He sees the concept of morality as a "philosophical (ethical) rather than a behavioral concept."¹⁰ Justin Aronfreed welcomes Piaget and Kohlberg's moral judgement work as an "antidote to a behavioristic paradigm, in which an act is regarded as 'moral', by virtue of its conformity to an external norm."¹¹ Kohlberg doesn't see how studying behavior can tell you much about moral maturity. Duska and Whelan explain Kohlberg's point with this example. A mature adult and a young child may both resist stealing an apple. Is there a difference in moral maturity? Their behavior doesn't show it, but their reasons for not stealing would.¹² It is only what the people involved think they are doing which sets their behaviors apart.

Kohlberg does not feel that people's statements about whether an action is right or wrong are worth much either. Both

¹⁰Lawrence Kohlberg, "From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. by Theodore Mischel (New York, Academic, 1971), p. 152.

¹¹Justin Aronfreed, "Moral Development from the Standpoint of a General Psychological Theory," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), p. 56.

¹²R. Duska and M. Whelan, A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), p. 43.

the mature adult and the young child will say that stealing the apple is wrong. It is their reasons why it is wrong which, to Kohlberg, indicate a level of moral maturity. It is the kind or quality of reason which marks development.

To obtain this kind of data (i.e. kind of reason given), Kohlberg, in his initial phase of research, presented children of varying ages with moral dilemmas for the purpose of seeing the kind of reason, not whether the 'right' answer was given. On the basis of much collected data, Kohlberg discerned the following stages of moral development.

Level 1 Preconventional

Stage 1 (heteronomous morality) At this stage a child is obedient because he wants to avoid breaking any rule which might result in punishment for him. Actions are judged by their physical consequences. The judgement of authority is considered superior and very powerful. A child, at this stage, doesn't consider the interests of others or even recognize that they may be different from his own. He cannot relate two points of view. He will confuse authority's perspective with his own.

Stage 2 (individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange) The child will still be egocentric but will be opportunistic as well. He will follow rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present in the form of, "I'll do this for you, if you do that for me." Consequences of actions are still understood in the physical sense of reward and punishment for himself but he is a little more willing to co-operate (or bargain) with others to get what he wants. He now recognizes that other people have their own interests which they have a right to pursue and which also might be in conflict with his. But there is still not yet a consciousness of social norms.

Level 2 Conventional

Stage 3 (mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and interpersonal conformity) At this stage a person is primarily influenced by the expectations of others and conforms willingly to social norms when met with social approval. He is eager to fulfill

the stereotyped image for proper behavior. He tries to live up to what is expected of him by people who are close to him. Actions, for the first time, are partly judged for their motives. "Being good" is important and includes having good motives and showing concern about others. Trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude all should have a part in a relationship. He believes in the Golden Rule and attempts to put himself in the other guy's shoes. Shared feelings, agreements, and expectations take primacy over individual interests. A person at this stage would have the desire to maintain rules and authority which are supportive of stereotypical good behavior. But they do not yet possess a generalized perspective.

Stage 4 (social system and conscience) Conformity and the maintenance of social order still dominate the pattern of thought, but, whereas in stage 3, the perspective was one of an individual in relationships with other individuals, the perspective here is broader. The individual is considered in terms of his relation to the system. Laws are to be upheld, except in extreme cases where they conflict with social duties. It is necessary to keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid a breakdown in the system. A person should be fulfilling the actual duties to which he has agreed, and be contributing to society, the group or the institution. He will often use the argument, "if everyone did that....."

Level 3 Post Conventional or Principled

Stage 5 (social contract or utility, and individual rights) A person at this stage considers the moral and legal points of view and has come to recognize that they can conflict and has trouble integrating them. He is aware that people hold a variety of different values and opinions, and that these, for the most part, are relative to a group. He believes that relative rules should usually be upheld because they do give a degree of impartiality, and are also part of a social contract. Life and liberty are nonrelative values and rights, and should be upheld in any society regardless of majority opinion. A person at this stage has a feeling of contractual commitment, which he freely enters upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligation. He will try to do the greatest good for the greatest number.

Stage 6 (universal ethical principles) This is a highly controversial stage, and it is still unclear whether it is a true hierarchially distinct stage above stage 5, or merely an alternate end point to stage 5. At this "stage" persons are to be treated

as ends in themselves. When laws violate one's self-chosen ethical principle, one should act in accordance with the principle because it is based on a universal principle of justice. The stage 6 reasoner places a greater emphasis on respect for life and the personality of the individual than the stage 5 thinker. This stage has been criticized for being elitist and culturally biased. Some have even said that the theory is just scientific justification for libertarian values and stage 6 is used to make moral heroes out of people like Daniel Ellsberg whose consciences bring them into conflict with society.¹³ (Note: Kohlberg no longer refers to or scores stage 6.¹⁴)

The core of Kohlberg's theory is based on the premise that moral stage is related to cognitive advance. Kohlberg claims that individuals pass through moral stages, one at a time, from the bottom toward the top. But there are also other stages an individual goes through, and to best understand Kohlberg's moral stage, it would be beneficial to locate it in a sequence of the total development of personality.

The Interrelation of the Different Components of Personality Development

Individuals also go through stages of logical reasoning or intelligence studied by Piaget.¹⁵ First is the intuitive stage. At this point, the child is very egocentric, and will view the world in terms of how it affects his personal welfare. At around age 7, the child enters the concrete opera-

¹³L. Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization," pp. 34-35.

¹⁴Jack Braeden Arbuthnot and David Faust, Teaching Moral Reasoning: Theory and Practice (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981), p. 66.

¹⁵Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies (New York: Random House, 1967).

tional stage where he sees the world in terms of a social or legal order. "Others" approval or condemnation is of the utmost importance. New interpersonal interactions emerge. The child can now make logical inferences, classify things, and handle quantitative relations about concrete things. The final stage, the formal operational, is reached, if at all, during adolescence. The individual can then reason abstractly. He can consider all the possibilities, consider the relations between elements in a system, form hypotheses, and test them against reality. Often this stage is not attained completely, only partially.

It is obvious to Kohlberg's mind that since moral reasoning is clearly reasoning, then advanced moral reasoning depends on advanced logical reasoning. Following this line of thinking, a person's logical stage would put a ceiling on the moral stage he could attain. A logical stage of "concrete operational" limits a person to the moral stages of 1 and 2. Many individuals are higher in logical stage than moral stage, but none are higher in moral stage than logical stage.¹⁶ Logical development, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral judgement in Kohlberg's analysis.

Following the sequence of total development of personality along, next come the stages of social perspective or role taking.¹⁷ These stages describe the level at which the

¹⁶L. Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization", p. 32.

¹⁷Ibid.

person sees other people, interprets their thoughts and feelings, and sees their role or place in society. There is a close relationship between role-taking stages and Kohlberg's moral stages. But role-taking stages are more general and precede the development of the parallel stage of moral judgement.

The final step in this sequence is moral behavior. Mature moral judgement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral action.¹⁸ Moral judgement is just one predictor of action, but Kohlberg sees it as a powerful and meaningful one because it gives rise to distinctive ways of defining concrete situational rights and duties in socially ambiguous situations. Kohlberg believes that there is such a thing as behavior which is consistent with an individual's moral principles and that maturity of moral thought should predict to moral action. J. Rest would support Kohlberg in this belief. He found that there is likely to be a reasonable match between the level of moral thinking and that of moral action (genuine moral thinking not simply verbalism.¹⁹) This means that specific forms of moral action require specific forms of moral thought as prerequisites. Kohlberg sees this as implying the cognitive developmental contention that maturity of moral judgement and action have heavy cognitive components, and suggests a broader developmental notion of action than that repre-

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹J. Rest, "Comprehension, preference and spontaneous usage in moral judgement," in Recent Research in Moral Development, ed. by L. Kohlberg and E. Turiel (New York: Holt, 1971).

seated by the "bag of virtues."

Cognitivists believe that moral decision making is, or at least can be, an intellectual process: reasons are not the only motives for actions, but they are considered important ones. They therefore argue for the moral domain to be treated as a domain of rational thought and psycho-social development.

Characteristics of a Theory Based on Cognitive Stages

There are certain characteristics a theory based on a doctrine of cognitive stages would have:

- 1) There are distinct differences in children's modes of solving the same problem which is implied by cognitive stages
- 2) There are different modes of thinking which form a sequence, order of succession, in individual development. Cultural factors speed up, slow down, or arrest development, but they don't change it.
- 3) Each different mode forms a structural whole, representing an underlying thought organization
- 4) Cognitive stages, or hierarchial integrations, form an order of increasingly integrated structures which will fulfill a common function. They supply the rules for the processing of information and the connecting of events.²⁰

Kohlberg's particular cognitive stages are stages of the development of a concept of justice. He explains how, as we pass through the different moral stages, the concept of justice is re-organized:

Stage 1 "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"
Stage 2 fair exchange of favors and goods

Piaget would assess these first two stages of reasoning

²⁰Jean Piaget, "The General Problem of Psychobiological Development in the Child," in Discussion on Child Development, Vol. 14, ed. by J. M. Tanner and B. Inhelder (New York: International University Press, 1960), pp. 13-15.

to be at the egocentric level of reasoning where the major goal is to avoid punishment and gain reward

Stage 3 treating people by conventional rules
Stage 4

These two stages correspond to Piaget's transcendental level of reasoning where we are more concerned with the order of the world.

Stage 5 the social contract between the governing and the governed protects the equal rights of all

Stage 6 a just solution to a moral dilemma is a solution acceptable to all parties considering each as free and equal. These are personally chosen moral principles which a person would choose if he didn't know what his place was to be in a society—upper class, lower class, etc. A just solution in any dilemma would have to be one acceptable to you if you had any of the roles involved.

Decisions based on universal principles are considered best. Those based on conventional moral rules bring disagreement because men adhere to conflicting systems of roles dependent on their culture. For examples of the latter, a woman's bare face is considered morally right in some cultures (western), but not in others (Moslem). Some cultures feel it morally right to punish non-virgin unmarried women (even to the point of death). In others, although punishment by death would be a crime, total ostracism might be called for. In still others, to interfere at all would be morally wrong.

How Development Occurs

Since the major objective of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory would be to have as many people as possible

reach his final stage of moral reasoning, it would be profitable to look at how it's done. A person is said to be at a certain stage when his thinking is organized in a particular way. Initially, they can be thought of as points of reference for consideration of moral problems by which a decision for or against a certain action can be reached. A moral stage implies that a person's whole outlook on a problem will be colored by this orientation. Since Kohlberg's moral stages are stages of structure, not content, they do not tell us what is on someone's mind, but only how he thinks about what is on his mind.

Cognitive development is the change in those cognitive structures. How can this change and the transition from one moral stage to the next be enhanced if not, as Kohlberg believes, by the direct result of teaching?

Kohlberg rejects maturation theories and several types of socialization hypotheses. He claims that empirical studies do not confirm the findings of the psychoanalytic school. Such studies do not show correlations between parental ways of handling infantile drives, and moral behaviors or attitudes which occur later.²¹ Research findings have also indicated that "children and young adults are no more like their parents in level of morality.....than they are like a random parental individual of the same social class."²² There is no clear support

²¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 362.

²²Ibid., pp. 469-470.

in regard to parent attitudes, that early identifications are central to a moral orientation.²³ There was a correlation found between maternal warmth and the development of conscience but the finding also indicates that children living in a positive social climate will be more willing to learn in general.²⁴ The positive results of such a positive climate are not restricted to a moral sphere but lead to a general tendency in the social attitude field.

Kohlberg also dismisses the moral concept of habit, his reasons for which are more fully discussed in chapter two. As indicated already, he uses the Hartshorne-May study as his reason for claiming that the habit-generalization theory of psychologists is invalid. The final volume of Studies in the Nature of Character explored the degree to which moral conduct related to other assessments of the child's moral functioning. The evidence indicated only a modest level of generality among different measures of honest conduct, and even less generality across behavioral, judgemental, and affective dimensions of honesty. Honesty is basically then, situation-specific. To employ a single or small number of measures to classify an individual as more or less honest or moral, is simply not supported by empirical evidence. Kohlberg reasons that moral learning from habit-generalization brings about only specific forms of behavior conformity. It does not bring about predictable behavior

²³Ibid., p. 363

²⁴Ibid.

for a wide range of situations which would be characteristic of the principles stage of morality. He challenges learning theorists to produce evidence which will show that early forms of habit training have an affect on later adult behavior.

Kohlberg has also rejected Piaget's hypothesis that the ~~peer~~ group plays an important role in moral development, in the sense that its norms are internalized by the individual. Although it has been shown that there is a correlation between peer-group participation and the development of a principled morality, Kohlberg argues that this is because of the stimulation which such a group provides for individual reflection upon situations.²⁵

Even though Kohlberg's forms of conceiving of rules at the different stages could be considered Kantian categories, he rejects Kant's view that they are innate moulds into which specific experiences are fitted.²⁶ As already noted, Kohlberg sees his categories as evolving as a result of interaction between the child, and his physical and social environment. He says that there are four basic assumptions a cognitive developmental theory can make about its development, which show the emphasis, he feels is needed, on interaction.

- 1) Development of cognitive structure is the result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment. It is not the direct result of learning or maturation.

²⁵Ibid. p. 401.

²⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "Early Education: a cognitive-developmental view," *Child Development*, 39, 1968, p. 1023.

- 2) Development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure which must be explained by parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.
- 3) Cognitive structures are always structures of action, resulting from the association of stimuli with one another, with the child's responses, and with his experiences of pleasure and pain. Cognitive activities go from the sensori-motor, to the symbolic, to verbal-propositional modes. Their organization is always an organization of actions upon objects.
- 4) The direction of development of cognitive structure is toward greater equilibrium in the interaction of the organism and its environment. For development to take place, there must be an optimal amount of discrepancy between the child's conceptual scheme and the type of experience with which he is confronted. It is very important for there to be a reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object or situation and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism. "This reciprocity, or balance, in interaction is reflected in the underlying stability (conservation) of a cognitive act under transformation with development representing a widened system of transformations maintaining such conservation."²⁷

Kohlberg expands and clarifies these basic assumptions. He says an individual constructs or builds a conception of the world through physical and/or mental involvement with objects, people and events. The experience we gain provides us with sets of knowledge, however informal and unorganized. The metaphor of a machine can be used. The environment is input (information or energy). It is transmitted to and accumulated in the organism, who emits output behavior. Kohlberg uses the term assimilation to refer to the period when information is being absorbed, and accommodation for the period that occurs after assimilation has altered the individual's understanding of events.

Knowledge that follows this pattern is organized into

²⁷L. Kohlberg, "Stage and sequence", p. 348.

schema, coherent sets of information about objects, events, etc. This knowledge base is obtained from the child's acting upon objects. The critical feature is that it is not a one way activity but an interaction which gradually stimulates the child to classify his environment in terms of objects having causal relations with other objects in space and time, and to make the distinction between what is real and what is apparent (i.e. dreams). Each new stage brings sensitivity to new aspects of a moral situation. New insights lead the child into gradually grasping more abstract ways of introducing order into the world. The child increasingly becomes able to objectify his knowledge, and forms concepts which can serve as guidelines against which objects or people can be gauged. The child is eventually led to apprehend principles, especially those of justice, which must be obtained if individuals are to live together and satisfy their claims as social beings, which are both similar to and different from others.

To recapitulate, Kohlberg says movement and the change in cognitive structures comes about through interaction between the child's cognitive structures and the structures of the environment. This development, according to Kohlberg, does not involve the unfolding of instincts, emotions, or sensorimotor patterns. Affect is considered, but only as a parallel aspect of the structural transformations which take place here in development. The child's relation to his social environment is seen as cognitive; and, development occurs through the changes in general patterns of thinking about the self and the world.

Stimulation can come by challenging the individual with moral problems for which his present moral stage cannot provide adequate answers. You then present him with responses from a higher stage. Experimental findings show that although children rarely comprehend messages from more than one stage away, they will also reject messages from stages below their own.²⁸

Optimal period

Kohlberg also claims there is an optimal period for moving from one stage to the next. If you have just attained a higher stage, you won't respond fully to stimulation for movement to the next. On the other hand, if too long a period passes, you tend to stabilize at your present stage and develop screening out mechanisms for contradictory stimuli which might help you to be motivated to reach out for the next higher level of reasoning to help solve the dilemma. Therefore, a lot of emphasis is placed on avoiding stage retardation, as well as promoting acceleration. To avoid retardation, stimulation must be presented in the period when the possibility to develop is still open.

Stages are universal, irreversible and of an invariant sequence

Another characteristic of the transition, according to Kohlberg, is that it is of an invariant sequence. You would

²⁸E. Turiel, "An experimental test of the sequentiality of developmental stages in the child's moral judgements," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 1966, pp.611-618.

not find someone thinking at one stage who hadn't passed through the previous stage.

He also sees the stages as irreversible. Although a person might still offer lower stage responses, he generally only accepts the higher reasons as determinative and will not lose his higher orientation. Kohlberg did have a problem of regression when he retested an original group of students. They had been at stage four and had inexplicably regressed to stage 2. He explains it in the following way. When the subjects were originally tested, it was during the 1960's when many third-year college students were trying to make the difficult transition to the principled levels of reasoning. To break out of the conventional level, they were questioning every standard of morality, passing through a phase in which all values not based on instinct were disturbed. This is sometimes referred to as stage 4½. Kohlberg explains that this transitional state led to a susceptibility to a variety of ideologies which mixed stage 2 instrumental hedonism with radical moral ideologies.²⁹

Despite harsh criticism, Kohlberg maintains his view that there are invariant sequences which will hold in any culture. He gives the following example of one invariant sequence: children reasoning about dreams from any culture start out by not being able to differentiate dreams from real events. Then they come to comprehend that dreams are not real, that they take

²⁹Jack Braeden Arbuthnot and David Faust, p. 84.

place within the dreamer and cannot be seen by others. They are immaterial events, like thoughts, produced by the dreamer.³⁰ This same sequence can be observed in cultures where adults have different beliefs about dreams. Kohlberg claims this sequence, or any other developmental sequence, cannot be adequately explained in terms of the teaching of adults because the concepts they would use if they taught anything about dreams, would be appropriate to a much later stage and would not explain how children go through the earlier stages.

In his argument supporting the universality of his moral stages, Kohlberg says that the cultural invariant is not the content of moral beliefs but their form. Different cultures have varying views on such things as sexual relationships outside of marriage, whether people should be thrifty, etc. But there are cross-cultural uniformities relating to how such rules are conceived. He asserts that major aspects of moral development are culturally universal because all cultures have common sources of social interaction, role taking and social conflict which require moral integration.

Kohlberg does provide some cross-cultural support for the universality of his stages and developmental approach. He reports that studies done in Taiwan, Turkey and Malaysia indicate a similar sequence of development in all cultures, although they suggest that the last two stages of moral thought do not

³⁰L. Kohlberg, "Early Education: A cognitive-developmental view," pp. 1024-9.

develop clearly in preliterate or tribal communities.³¹ He also found that in American society, middle class children proceed more rapidly through his stages than working class children. The regional differences that can be found are explained as fixations or arrests of thought at certain stages of development. The sequence, in these cases, has not been broken, nor should we think of these people as incapable of higher level reasoning.

Critics have questioned the sufficiency in scope of Kohlberg's cross-cultural studies. E. L. Simpson criticizes Kohlberg for data gathering techniques that demand analytical modes of thought and language not valued by or developed in many cultures. Simpson also challenges the use of value categories such as "properties rights" and "value of life" for scoring protocols that may not reflect the categories of the culture under study.³² Simpson claims Kohlberg's concept of justice is unclear and that he fails to deal explicitly with the problem of objectivity in morals. She sees the need for universally accepted considerations, such as those to do with human harm and benefit, for there to be agreement in judgement in the moral case. The term justice can have many meanings. Simpson argues, "Highly abstract concepts such as justice, have so little commonality in meaning, from one group to another, as to be practically useless as cross-cultural generalizations."³³

³¹Arbuthnot and Faust, p. 80.

³²Elizabeth L. Simpson, "Moral development research: A case of scientific cultural bias," Human Development, 17, No. 2, 1974, pp. 81-106.

³³Ibid., p. 96.

Aronfreed gives some support to her argument. He maintains that it is very probable that increasing cognitive capacity for discrimination and abstraction enables more abstract principles to be adopted. Since self-direction is a common western value, increasing cognitive capacity manifests itself in an increasing tendency to accept principles allowing and encouraging, up to a point, autonomy, such as individual rights, democracy and individual conscience. But, Aronfreed warns, this increasing cognitive capacity might mean the development of different kinds of principles in other societies.³⁴

Kohlberg admits the difficulty of adapting an assessment device to varied cultures so as to eliminate all the performance factors except level of structural moral thought. But he could easily retort, "Can one logically test the universality of moral stages, defined in terms of value categories, without using the same value categories from one culture to another?"³⁵

Kohlberg's sequence has also been challenged, since, in many cultures, there is no progression through to the final stages of postconventional reasoning, and because, in the same culture, there are great individual differences. Again Kohlberg could respond with a question of his own, "Can one logically require that all groups everywhere must demonstrate all levels

³⁴Justin Aronfreed, Conduct and Conscience: The socialization of internalized control over behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1968).

³⁵Thomas Lickona, "Critical Issues in Moral Development and Behavior," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston), p. 10.

in the moral hierarchy in order to establish its universality, especially in view of the fact that the theory does not expect the higher stages to occur under social-cultural conditions that are deficient in role-taking opportunities?"³⁶ Kohlberg says that to require this, one would also have to require that the highest levels be reached in every sub-culture and possibly even in every individual. This could not be a workable test of the validity of a high level moral stage. Cultural differences in level of attainment do not rule out a stage theory, in Kohlberg's mind, any more than individual differences would.

Carol Gilligan claims there is a built in male bias in Kohlberg's scale.³⁷ She found that in a few studies of comparable groups of men and women, more women ended up in stage 3 and more men in stage 4. She says it is because the kind of moral dilemma chosen to be looked at emphasized such things as justice, property, and conflict of rights rather than issues of caring and responsibility toward the community which might show more women at the upper end of the scale. Kohlberg said these findings were later found to be due to an error in stage criteria. There was an initial tendency to put men with an "Archie Bunker" mentality in the law and order stage 4. But an Archie Bunker type actually belongs, Kohlberg now thinks, in stage 3 because such an individual is not concerned with larger society, just his own group.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Carol Gilligan, "Responses to temptation: An analysis of motives," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1963).

Importance of interaction

Leaving for the moment, any more discussion of criticisms of Kohlberg's theory to chapter two, let us look at just what is implied by such a theory of cognitive stages.

The existence of Kohlberg's moral stages has implied that moral development has a basic structural component. This study has already examined why Kohlberg views his stages as stages of structure, not content. The existence of a basic structural component has implications in itself;

- 1) There should be some empirical correlation between moral judgement maturity and nonmoral aspects of cognitive development.
- 2) Moral judgement stages or sequences are to be described in cognitive structural terms even in regard to the affective aspects (i.e. guilt, shame, empathy, etc.)
- 3) There should be an empirical correlation between maturity on affective and cognitive aspects of morality.³⁸

Relationship between IQ and moral behavior

To comment on the first implication listed above there seems to be little theoretical dispute over the fact that intelligence relates strongly to moral judgement and behavior.³⁹ The dispute is over how much impact intelligence has and whether high IQ ensures high moral development. For example, one might ask, "What about the clever criminal?" Mischel and Mischel examined a variety of studies and concluded that there was a definite

³⁸L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization," p. 390.

³⁹See Aronfreed, Kohlberg, Lickona, Mischel and Mischel, and Selman in Moral Development and Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976).

relation between cognitive competence and general adequacy of social functioning.⁴⁰ For example, IQ positively correlated with maturity on Piagetian tests of moral judgement and negatively related to dishonest behavior.⁴¹ The relationship between IQ and honesty declines or disappears when the context is nonacademic, such as stealing, or when the risk of getting caught is low.⁴² And although high IQ children do do better than low IQ children on most Piagetian tests of moral judgement, for some dimensions the reverse is true.⁴³

Cognitive developmental theorists explain that even though moral maturity has a cognitive base, there is obviously more to it than simply verbal intelligence applied to a moral problem. A given stage of cognitive development is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the parallel moral stage.

In other words, various studies noted by Kohlberg, claim findings that show children below average in IQ are almost all below average in moral maturity. But children above average in IQ are equally likely to be high or low in maturity.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Walter Mischel and Harriet N. Mischel, "A Cognitive Social-Learning Approach to Morality and Self Regulation," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976).

⁴¹Thomas Lickona, "Research on Piaget's Theory of Moral Development," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976).

⁴²Roger V. Burton, "Honesty and Dishonesty," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976).

⁴³T. Lickona, "Research on Piaget's Theory of Moral Development."

⁴⁴R. Kramer, "Moral Development in young adulthood," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967),

This provides a possible explanation for the clever criminal. These theories suggest not only nonlinear relation between IQ and moral maturity but a decline in the correlation between the two with age. Moral judgement can continue to develop until about age 25 whereas general intellectual maturity does not.⁴⁵ Bright children attain the level of formal operations earlier than slow children, but the point is that slow ones eventually do attain them. They develop more slowly in moral development and therefore it may take longer. IQ is a better indicator of early rate of development than it is of terminal status which is more determined by social experience. Our starting points are the same. Everyone reasons as a young child at what Kohlberg labels stage 1. Most children then move on to Kohlberg's stage 2. As early as age 9, but usually later, most North Americans enter stage 3. Some pass into stage 4 in middle or late adolescence. The transition to stage 5 takes place, if at all, when people are in their late teens or early twenties, or even later in life. The few people who do attain stage 6 are usually at least twenty-five. Kohlberg has found that most adult North Americans reason at the conventional level of stages 3 and 4, and only a small minority, perhaps five or 10 percent, attain full stage 5 thought.

quoted in L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," p. 391.

⁴⁵ibid.

Importance of cognitive definitions

Cognitivists use the Milgram experiments to help validate the second of the previously mentioned implications, and to clear up what they feel is the importance of the role of cognitive definitions in determining moral choice.⁴⁶ In these experiments, the experimenter, who is a high school biology teacher with an impassive but stern voice, orders the subject to give increasingly painful electrical shocks to a victim who is actually in on the experiment. The victim really acts the part complete with screams of pain. Only those at stage 6 questioned the authority's moral right to tell them to inflict pain on another individual strongly enough to actually refuse to go on. Those at stage 5 (social contact) could rationalize away their responsibility to the victim since he voluntarily participated with foreknowledge of the situation. Seventy-five percent of stage 6 subjects quit whereas only 13% of all remaining subjects did. The experimenter himself showed stage four thinking as he is obedient throughout his work to the demands of his science, even at the cost of possibly causing his subjects permanent psychological harm. The subjects were anything but blasé about their performances. Many were described as trembling, sweating profusely, and even biting through their lips as they steadily increased the voltage to their learner.⁴⁷ Many afterwards probably had to deal with a lot of guilt and

⁴⁶S. Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 1963, pp. 371-378.

⁴⁷Ibid.

negative self feelings.

What made the person at stage 6 stop giving electrical shocks was not a projective measure of sympathy but, according to the cognitivist, his cognitive definitions. High empathy subjects, they claim, were no more likely to quit giving shocks than low empathy subjects. Schacter and Latané argue that the arousal of affectivity is relevant to the control of behavior only when it is given appropriate cognitive labelling.⁴⁸ The role of moral judgement is due to its contribution to a cognitive definition of the situation rather because strong attitudinal or affective expressions of moral values activate behavior.

In a Berkeley sit-in demonstration, where a campus administration building was occupied, the highest level moral reasoners of stage 6 disobeyed authorities in the name of general individual rights, but not for individual rights involving empathy for a concrete victim. This suggests to many that the stage 6 decision to sit-in, did not have an affective base, as it was their cognitive definition of the situation which defined behavior.

Schacter and Singer did an experimental study to support this line of thinking that emotions are differentiated more by their mental than by their physiological characteristics.⁴⁹

⁴⁸S. Schacter and R. Latané, "Crime, cognition and the autonomic system," in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. by M. R. Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), pp. 221-275.

⁴⁹S. Schacter and J. E. Singer, "Cognitive, Social and physiological determinants of emotional state," Psychological Review, 69, 1962, pp. 379-399.

They injected subjects with a hormone to produce sympathetic activation. The subjects were then exposed to different social situations. The resulting emotion was determined by the person's cognitive appraisal of the particular situation to which he was exposed (one situation deliberately was meant to induce anger, another euphoria). Socially communicated symbolic cognitive definitions, according to Schacter and Singer, determine the actual felt attitudes and emotions experienced by the individual in a given situation. For example, with the use of marijuana, there is a general arousal elicited, but how that arousal is experienced (anger, elation, etc.) again was found to depend upon the cognitive definition of the situation.

Place of Affect in a Cognitive Theory

This paper will now take a more explicit look at how Kohlberg and other cognitivists view what they consider to be the parallel aspect of development, the affect, and how it is treated in cognitive-developmental theory.

Cognitivists argue that affect itself is neither moral nor immoral. When affective arousal is channelled into moral directions, it is moral. When it is not so channelled, it is not. The moral channelling mechanisms themselves are cognitive principles. Cognitivists assert that you follow moral principles in a situation because you feel they correctly define that situation, not because of an abstract affective identification with that principle.

Cognitivists believe that internalized affective

control of behavior can be much more effectively carried by cognitive representations which can serve as a common intrinsic bridge across the entire sequence of cues that unfold as an act is initiated and completed. For example, Piaget has labeled 'will' as the affective operation. Many cognitivists see will as an operation of intelligence bearing on the co-ordination and the conservation of verifications or relations. Will occurs when there is a conflict of tendencies. One tendency, corresponding to desire, is initially strong. Another tendency, initially weak, corresponds to a tendency on a higher level such as duty, or to a value judged superior to desire. An act of will, therefore, is to reverse the situation, thwart the strong desire and reinforce the weak tendency, so that now the weak tendency has become strong and the strong tendency has become defeated. Cognitivists reason that why an inferior desire is stronger at the beginning is because we have forgotten to think of the past or future. We think only of the present. To give in to desire means to stay in the present. When there is decentration and reversibility, when we can remember what has preceded, and anticipate or foresee what can follow, the superior tendency can remove the inferior one. This additional force, which deals with the conservation of values by recalling the past and anticipating the future, was needed to have a successful act of will.

Kohlberg believes that the 'moral sentiments' (i.e. fear, shame, guilt) are not separate from cognition but derive from the person's underlying stage organization just as moral

judgements do. Moral stages, he says, allow one to interpret and channel affect. If we don't know the person's stage of moral reasoning, we could not know the effect emotion would have on behavior. Kohlberg gives the following example;

Two adolescents, thinking of stealing, may have the same feeling of anxiety in the pangs of their stomachs. One adolescent (stage 2) interprets the feeling as "being chicken" and goes ahead and does it. The other (stage 4) interprets the feeling as "the warning of my conscience" and decides accordingly. The difference in reaction is one in cognitive-structural aspects of moral judgement, not in emotional "dynamics" as such. Guilt as dread of self-condemnation is the final step in a series of differentiations, which like all differentiations is cognitive in nature.⁵⁰

The specific quality of an affective state, according to cognitivists, is determined by its cognitive housing.

A Cognitive Curriculum

Even though cognitivists will grant that the affective is a necessary component in the objectives of moral education, they do not feel the process of moral education need include a substantial slice of affective education. They feel that the best way to achieve affective change may be through the use of a curriculum emphasizing the rational and the intellect.

Cognitivists criticize the hardcore affectivists for being a "bunch of do-gooders whose highest aim is to develop a 'positive attitude' in some direction which is either undefined or undefended, and is very likely to be different in itself or in its specific implications for every authority on

⁵⁰L. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development," pp. 189-190.

affective education."⁵¹ They feel this isn't much of a contribution to morality and may even be detrimental. "Affect as an end in itself, only replaces moral apathy with moral anarchy."⁵² Affect has its place, but to a cognitivist, only as entirely subservient to cognition and as the last supplement in the pedagogy of ethics.

First must come the legitimation of ethics itself, then the cognitive structuring or moral education, then the teaching of the basic cognitive elements in ethics, and only then the affect, the icing on the cake.⁵³

I think it is clear that the cognitivist feels that the foundations of ethics, as well as everyday moral reasoning (done within the framework of ethics), are matters for reasoning to investigate and establish. For them, it is obvious that law and morality should be thought of as sensible, reasonable institutions, at least in principle.

The cognitivists's curriculum's first component would be knowledge about and understanding of the facts, including arguments and positions involving moral issues.⁵⁴ Some of this knowledge will be picked up while covering other subjects in the regular curriculum. But much of it is to be learned in discussions about moral issues and role playing. They truly believe that real cognitive understanding will, in fact, lead to

⁵¹Michael Scriven, "Cognitive Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappa, Vol. LVI, No. 10, June, 1975, pp. 689-60.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 692-693.

sympathy etc., in other words, to an alteration of affect. This is a good part of the reason that the cognitivist feels it is not necessary to make a direct effort in the affective dimension.

Their curriculum's second major component would include the cognitive skills of moral reasoning developed to the level of confidence where they can be used in social argumentation (which involves both the distractions of what they consider irrelevant emotions, not that they view all emotions as irrelevant, and the necessity for very rapid response).

The third component would include the nature, origin, and foundations of ethics, sometimes called metaethics. They feel the moral curriculum has to be committed to eternal willingness to investigate every claim it considers, to support every inclination it favors, to examine what it is doing as well as what others are doing.

The cognitive retort to any affective approach is three-fold. With limited exceptions, it tends to be immoral, ineffective and unnecessary.⁵⁵ They criticize affective education for its attempted modification of affect/attitudes/values in other ways than through the use of reason. Cognitivists see this approach more as manipulation than education. Although they admit that some education appears to achieve some or even most of its effect through non-rational influences, they do not concede that the affective is necessarily involved since such effects

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 691.

can be achieved either unintentionally, or, subsequently to the use of reason.

Kohlberg's Cognitive Curriculum

Kohlberg believes that moral development depends upon stimulation defined in cognitive-structural terms. This stimulation, according to Kohlberg, comes from social interaction, moral decision making, moral dialogue and moral interaction. The first step in creating the right conditions for all this to take place is to form groups based on an initial assessment of stages. Ideally each group (of 8-12 individuals) should consist of students from two or three consecutive stages, equally represented. The advantages of this are to ensure a range of viewpoints, but viewpoints close enough in succession so that upward mobility is enhanced.

The second step is to choose and prepare a dilemma suitable to the needs of the specific class. It must be one likely to create disequilibrium, and provide stimulation for discussion. It must be open-ended and likely to have several alternative answers. The following is a well known example of a dilemma meeting all these criteria.

Heinz's Dilemma

In Europe, a woman was near death from a rare form of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her, a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist was charging \$2,000, ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together half of what the drug cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No." So Heinz got desperate and broke

into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.⁵⁶

After choosing a dilemma, before any discussion begins, certain guidelines must be set. The participants must know and understand the purpose for the groups and use of the dilemmas. They should know what's expected of them, and some ethical principles should be agreed upon for each member for group participation. For example, mutual respect of one another's opinions should be stressed. Disagreement is allowed but not a statement like, "Your opinion is stupid," or "You say that because you're Jewish."

The fourth step involves initiating the discussion by presenting the dilemma and obtaining initial opinions. In order for the type of Socratic dialogue to take place that Kohlberg is hoping for, you must first create dissatisfaction in the student about his present knowledge of the good. This can be done experimentally by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his existing principles have no ready answer. The second step is to expose him to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers, some of whom are at a higher (+1) moral maturity level. So a student at stage 2 might be in an argument with a student at stage 3. And then of course, the stage 3 student should be exposed to the arguments of a stage 4 student in a conflict situation. As already noted there are experimental findings which show that individuals can absorb moral reasoning from the next higher level, while rejecting

⁵⁶L. Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization," pp.41-42.

reasoning from a level below their own.

There is another type of conflict which might occur which will be less preferable since it is less conducive to moral growth. It occurs when individuals hold different opinions but these opinions are founded on reasoning either at the same stage or two or more stages apart. One child may argue that Heinz should steal the drug basing this on stage 2 reasoning, and another may argue he should not, basing this also on stage 2 reasoning, or basing it on stage 4 or 5 reasoning. In either case there is no exposure to a +1 model. The educator's role is therefore to guide and direct subsequent debates for +1 argument to evolve.

The major role of the educator is to support, clarify, or bring out the +1 stage reasoning for each student involved in the discussion. Certain open-ended questions are much more useful in encouraging the individual to express underlying reasoning than simple "why" or closed-ended questions. For the Heinz dilemma, here are some examples:

closed: Should Heinz steal the drug or should he not steal the drug?

open: What do you think are some of the most important reasons why Heinz should or should not steal the drug?

closed: Well, is it right or wrong?

open: What are some of your ideas about whether this action was right or wrong?

closed: Would your friends say the same thing?

open: How might your friends think about the things we are discussing?⁵⁷

It is sometimes necessary for the educator to use ela-

⁵⁷Arbuthnot and Faust, p. 116.

borations and qualifiers in order to stimulate and guide discussion in the right direction. What if there is unanimous agreement on the fairest solution to a dilemma? For example, what if everyone in the group decided Heinz should steal the drug and based this decision on stage 2 reasoning? One might ask the following questions:

Suppose it were a friend, not his wife?
 Suppose it were a stranger?
 Should the judge punish the husband?

Discussion should continue as long as it is productive.

Kohlberg's Platonic belief is that after inspiring cognitive conflict in a student and pointing the way to the next step higher, he will tend to see things previously invisible to him and accept the higher stage's reasoning as better. Kohlberg sees moral growth as being facilitated through the direct experience of making and defending decisions which might arouse internal contradictions in one's moral reasoning structure. Through exposure to the moral reasoning of a significant other at a higher reasoning stage and through reflective organization, movement to the next stage can occur.

Kohlberg places a great deal of importance on the presence of role taking opportunities. As already noted, Kohlberg believes that the attainment of a given role-taking stage is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for moral development. He sees one's role-taking level as a bridge between the logical or cognitive level, and the moral level. It is one's level of social cognition. The process involves an organized structural relationship between self and others. It involves

understanding and relating to all the roles of the society in which one is a part. He stresses that role-taking should go on in all social interactions, not only in situations which arouse the emotions of sympathy or guilt.

If one were using role playing or simulation in conjunction with discussion on the Heinz Dilemma the educator might want to assign the volunteers (no one should be forced to participate here) in the following way. If one student had been arguing that the druggist should not sell the drug to Heinz even after hearing his plight, he might benefit most playing the role of Heinz. This can serve to increase his insight into a perspective previously quite narrow. The educator should try to maximize the students' involvement and make sure that the important conflicts implied by the dilemma are covered. Followup discussion is highly recommended.

Kohlberg's Socratic classroom discussion and role playing is only a stepping stone in genuine moral education. A broader, more complete approach implies full student participation in the social and moral findings of a school in which justice is a living matter. Kohlberg feels the perceived moral level provided by an institution is important because he believes that just as appropriate exposure to higher stage moral reasoning will stimulate growth so will exposure to a higher stage environment. The moral level projected by an institution is important to Kohlberg because he believes that, "individuals respond to a composite of moral reasoning, moral action, and institutionalized rules as a relatively unified whole in relation to their own moral

stage."⁵⁸ In other words, young people will not learn to decide and act effectively in a social context of democratic co-operation (higher state of moral development), if the institutions in which they are taught are structured primarily on the basis of the (lower stage) norms of reward and punishment. The school must embody a democratic or social contract perspective or efforts to teach that, says Kohlberg, are useless.

He calls upon teachers to challenge the students with some real-life situations—the moral issues faced by a school community, and to treat them as problems to be solved, not as situations in which rules are mechanically applied. The teacher should pose the problem and more than stimulating discussion, she should stimulate reasoning. There are a multitude of actual events that could be used as a springboard for moral discussion. As noted by Arbuthnot and Faust, "Working with events that have actually occurred elicits interest and helps students tie the abstract ideas and principles they are discovering to concrete world events."⁵⁹ Classes in other subjects in the curriculum, social studies, government, history, health all contain material that sometimes involves moral issues, e.g. the equal rights amendment, welfare spending, Karen Quinlan and artificial maintenance of human life, the population crisis, etc.

Kohlberg goes a step beyond this with his concept of a "just" school. His alternative type school is based upon the

⁵⁸L. Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization," p. 51.

⁵⁹Arbuthnot and Faust, p. 204.

principle of democracy. Students are given the chance to control the decisions made in their regard. Ideally, decisions are to be made by consensus rather than by majority rule. This places responsibility on each member to struggle to see through his own desires to the higher needs of others and the community. The results of these decisions are not traditional rules, but agreements entered into by everyone. Kohlberg realizes that all schools need not and cannot be these self-contained little Republics but claims that any "such school would stand as a good challenge to an educational establishment which makes a pious bow to the bag of virtues while teaching that true goodness is tested on the College Boards."⁶⁰

Summary

The aim of this portion of the paper was to follow the development of Kohlberg's theory on moral development from its origins in Kohlberg's rejection of the traditional bag of virtues approach to its eventual application to a school curriculum. It was shown how a theory whose central theme is justice, which Kohlberg sees as the one and only moral virtue, was developed through research into a theory of cognitive stages. These cognitive moral stages were given a placement in the total development of personality, so we could see how the different factors of personality relate to each other.

Kohlberg sees cognitive development occurring as the result of interaction between the organism and his environment.

⁶⁰L. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 83.

These interactions lead to basic transformations of cognitive structure occurring in the direction of greater equilibrium between child and environment.

The transition from stage to stage was shown to be characterized by certain traits, and we found that there were optimal periods for this transition or progression to take place.

The place and importance of the role of the non-cognitive elements such as affect was studied. They were given secondary status, being seen as beneficial only when viewed through cognitive definitions or representations.

This portion of the study also made a practical application of Kohlberg's theory to a curriculum heavily balanced in favor of advancing cognitive skills with the hope and belief that the non-cognitive (i.e. affective) can be best served in this way also.

CHAPTER II

The Non-Cognitive ResponseIntroduction

Just as Kohlberg found fault with what he held to be the traditional theory of moral development, the bag of virtues approach, the paper in this part will now approach his theory with the same critical mind to find its deficiencies, if there be any.

This study does not concern itself with all possible areas of criticism. It focusses on the placement and treatment of such "non-cognitive" concepts as the role of content in moral development, the importance of habit and habituation, the relation of thought and feeling or, in cognitivists' terms, the cognitive and the affective. The purpose of these criticisms is to show that Kohlberg's response to the non-cognitive features of moral development needs amending. The paper will give evidence which supports the need to reconceive items in Kohlberg's theory that have been poorly treated. It will argue that not only is Kohlberg's relative neglect of these features indefensible, but incompatible with his theory of stimulating moral development through cognitive stimulation.

This section will show, through the works of such people as John Wilson, William Frankena, John Dewey and Richard Peters, the necessity of reorganizing the value and importance given to

the features of moral content, habit and emotion. This recognition is integrally connected to the conception of these terms at variance with Kohlberg's conception of them.

Kohlberg, based on a superficial view of Aristotle, and what he takes to be prior theory, discards the content of morality as irrelevant, and nothing but a "bag of virtues". This overgeneralization led him to dismiss character-trait development and habit formation as fruitless practices. This restrictive outlook leaves several questions not sufficiently answered in his theory of cognitive development. How, for instance, does a child who has not yet reached Piaget's autonomous level of thinking (developed well after the age of seven or eight) conduct himself rationally and intelligently and with a certain degree of spontaneity, if he is not yet capable of this form of life? In a world where children cheat, steal and act aggressively, and, in a world where 90% of the people are not likely to emerge beyond Kohlberg's stage 3 or 4 (Kohlberg's own estimate), how can we not, practically speaking, as educators value content? As Peters points out in "Why Doesn't Lawrence Kohlberg do his Homework?", the policeman cannot always be present, so, should we not be concerned that our fellow citizens at least get a conventional morality instilled in them?

There are certain basic rules of content, in addition to Kohlberg's principles such as keeping your contracts, preserving property whether public or private, not stealing, the general observance of which is essential to the maintenance of social life under almost any conceivable conditions. These can be

straightforwardly justified by an appeal to Kohlberg's principles and surely are in a different class than such controversial rules as those relating to sexual practices or Trade Unions. We need a high degree of conformity to these basic rules, be it on principled grounds or conventional. Certainly this is no argument for the superiority or preference of the conventional type morality, only for its logical and practical necessity in any account of moral life. And theoretically speaking, Peters claims that this "good boy" stage is crucial; for it is at this stage the child learns from the inside, as it were, what it is to follow a rule. Unless he has learned this well (whatever it means!), the notion of following his own rules at the autonomous stage is unintelligible.¹ How can one have abstract principle without concrete situations to base them on? Kohlberg agrees to the importance of will in morality but supplies no account of how its growth can be encouraged or how we are to learn moral rules in the face of counter-inclinations. Can we not use a type of habit training to develop this ego strength? And what about moral emotions such as "concern for others", guilt, etc., or what Peters refers to as the "rational passions"?

If moral development is to be successful, and if prosocial behavior is to be fostered, it is the premise of this paper that these questions need to be answered. Kohlberg himself

¹Richard Peters, "Why Doesn't Lawrence Kohlberg Do His Homework?" in Moral Education, ed. by D. Purpel and K. Ryan (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Company, 1976), p. 289.

seems oblivious to the importance of these types of criticism levelled against him, and therefore, he is not likely to endeavor to eliminate or correct them. Kohlberg's research is of an inestimable value to moral development and theory but it is just one among many competing conceptions. His theory deals with only one aspect of morality, an essential aspect no doubt, but using moral conflict is only one way of promoting moral development—and not necessarily the most significant.² We need to look to the work of those who have proposed approaches which differ from Kohlberg's for additional valuable research and strategies.

Kohlberg's Objections to Content,
Character Traits and Habit

A glaring omission in Kohlberg's theory, and not one of inadvertence, is the content of morality. Kohlberg repeatedly tells us that a "bag of virtues" is unimportant in a person's moral equipment. He has two main objections to the "bag of virtues" which this paper will now refute. First of all, he tells us there are no such things and he has no idea what virtue really is anyway.³ Speaking to this point, it must first be remarked that Kohlberg evidently does have a fair grasp of what virtue is and that he has quite a powerful "bag" of them even at his principled stages of five and six; justice, benevolence, respect and truth—to name a few. Secondly, Kohlberg has restricted character

²Brian Crittenden, Form and Content in Moral Education (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1972), p. 86.

³L. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 63.

traits to situation-specific habits and virtues thereby ignoring the rich diversity of legitimate meanings character can have. By enriching our conception of character and associated views of reason and action we open the door to a more comprehensive, complete view of moral development.

In his second objection, Kohlberg tells us that the bag of virtues approach doesn't work because he doesn't believe virtues can be taught, or, even if they could we wouldn't know who could teach them. But, Kohlberg says, if it appears that something called virtue is being taught it is immaterial anyway because being content-specific, it cannot aid the child in proceeding in his development to a principled level of morality. C. Hamm answers the first part of Kohlberg's objection in the following way:

This flies in the face of common sense and common knowledge. Parents, teachers, relatives, and other adults as well as siblings, friends, and other peers 'teach' moral virtues by setting down rules, by reminding and reprimanding, by praising and blaming, by rewarding and punishing, by frowning and smiling—in short by precept and example.⁴

Kohlberg says these techniques do not work, meaning that these efforts to instill virtue do not result in the dispositions attributed to a virtuous person and that these efforts do not enhance the development of moral judgement in keeping with his stage theory. Kohlberg is fond of citing the research findings of the Hartshorne-May studies as evidence for his objections. But I

⁴Cornel M. Hamm, "Chapter Three: The Content of Moral Education or 'The Bag of Virtues'," in Yearbook: The Teaching of Values in Canadian Education, Vol. 21975 (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Society for the Study of Education).

think Kohlberg was a bit too eager to find proof for his beliefs and through teleological thinking deduced that the teaching of moral virtues is ineffective and efforts to do so should be abandoned. From the evidence produced by the Hartshorne-May studies, (honesty is situation-specific), I do not feel Kohlberg is making reasonable conclusions. All we should deduce from these research findings is that the methods used for instilling virtue into the children tested were not completely successful. R. Burton says:

A full reading of Hartshorne and May's report (1928) reveals that it would be wrong to cite them as having demonstrated that there was no generality or individual consistency of moral conduct, that acts of resisting temptation were completely situationally determined with nothing attributable to individual differences in the subjects.⁵

Soon after publication of the third and final volume of the Studies in the Nature of Character in 1930 investigators began expressing concern that the author's conclusion of specificity could be exaggerated or that the model of trait theory they had rejected was too extreme.⁶ Kohlberg tried to draw conclusions from the data with the broadest possible context extending the findings to persons beyond the immediate sample and also to other instances of behavior connoted not only by the label honesty, but virtue as well. The Hartshorne-May studies were not proven relevant beyond the particular operational definitions of their particular study. Perhaps the conclusion that should be drawn from such a study is that more consistent and perhaps rigorous attempts

⁵Roger V. Burton, "Honesty and Dishonesty," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), p. 175.

⁶Ibid.

should be made at instilling specific virtues into children. At the least, empirical evidence against the effectiveness of teaching virtues is decidedly inconclusive.⁷

What about Kohlberg's claim that the bag of virtues approach, even if it could be effective, would be detrimental to the progression through the stages of his cognitive developmental theory? Rather than being detrimental, this paper will now, through a more elaborated discussion of these objections, attempt to show that this approach can be compatible with, and even necessary to, his structural theory of moral development.

Further Argument for the Importance of Content in the Moral Sphere

The content of a person's beliefs and life experiences is indispensable in constructing a profile of the total moral personality. W. P. Alston argues that "not all of what we need to know about a person to fully understand his moral character is culturally invariant.....morality is content as well as form and we need to know both."⁸ The force of content or culture in governing moral life is obvious if one looks at James Gilligan's study of shame and guilt cultures.⁹ The shame-oriented Kwakiutl Indians displayed dire fear of ridicule and savage aggression. The guilt-oriented Hutterites were characterized by total self-

⁸W. P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. by T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 283.

⁹J. Gilligan, "Beyond Morality: Psychoanalytic reflections on shame, guilt, and love," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 144-158.

renunciation and pacifism. Although these are two extreme examples, it is obvious that their "content-defined moral value dispositions colored virtually every aspect of the human relationships and goal-oriented activity of these cultures, yet they pass completely through the structural sieve."¹⁰

Content vitally affects the application of principles both in the lives of societies and individuals. In education, content is crucial, because unless there is a determinate content, principles would have no function; for they are what we appeal to when we criticize or justify some form of conduct. What counts as welfare, for instance, depends very much on current social practices and individual needs (a normative notion). R. S. Peters says that "there is no slide-rule for applying abstract principles to concrete situations. How they are applied, which is often highly controversial, depends upon judgement and what Kohlberg calls the 'content' of morality in a given society."¹¹ It is logically absurd to suppose that generalizations can be made without particulars. To understand a principle means understanding the instances having common characteristics making them fall within the same class. And the more extensive the class, the more adequate the abstract principle. David Hume stresses the importance of experience in forming satisfactory abstract ideas. If we have the habit or custom of mind to see one member of a certain

¹⁰T. Lickona, "Critical Issues in Moral Development and Behavior," p. 11.

¹¹R. Peters, "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education," Journal of Moral Education, 7, May, 1978, p. 154.

class resembling another/as circumstances require and therefore applying the same name, we are more apt to possess adequate abstract ideas depending upon how many objects our minds are in the habit of conceiving. For adequate abstract principles of morality we need extensive concrete content. As Peters puts it, "... by calling something like respect for a person a 'principle' we mean that it embodies a consideration to which appeal¹² is made when criticizing, justifying, or explaining some determinate content of behavior or belief." Our content provides us with the necessary basis to reflect on rules in the light of principles and to accept or reject those which we deem justifiable or non-justifiable.

Content must be learnt prior to, or at the least, simultaneously with principles. There is no dispute over the fact that children can and do learn situation-specific rules of behavior before they grasp the principles which cover a wide range of cases. Because of his cognitive-developmental perspective, Kohlberg purports that adults should view the child as a 'moral philosopher' in his own right and assist him in his development through the six stages by providing cognitive stimulation. But even Kohlberg admits that this progression from stage to stage cannot be directly taught, and yet content can be. A child at the egocentric stages of one and two, abides by rules to avoid punishment and to obtain reward. There is no other way a rule is meaningful to a small child as a guide to conduct except as

¹²R. Peters, Reason and Compassion (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 60-61.

linked with approval and disapproval, reward and punishment. How could one provide Kohlberg's 'cognitive stimulation' at this level except as a clarification and illustration of a body of rules? Obviously the children would have to be taught these rules. And since Kohlberg insists that children must pass through this stage, it would be futile to teach these rules without providing corresponding rewards and punishment, as at this stage the child cannot see their point deriving from principles.

At the next level, stages three and four, rule-conformity is of the utmost importance. Through appropriate cognitive stimulation children can begin to question the validity of such rules and come to accept them because they are morally justifiable. This presupposes a thorough understanding of the rules—it presupposes content.

As already noted, at Kohlberg's highest principles level of stages five and six, justice, human welfare, respect for persons and society all appear as part of one's 'bag'. Although Kohlberg claims he dispenses with moral content, in actuality, it seems a necessary ingredient for his developmental approach to proceed. This contradictory situation is reflected in the way that his position can fluctuate quite sharply. He has said in fact, in reference to the adequacy of formal criteria for distinguishing moral judgements, that "social content must in addition be considered."¹³ In this same report a few pages later he claims

¹³Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage of moral development as a basis for moral education," unedited version as presented to a conference on moral education, sponsored by the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, June 21-23, 1968, p. 36.

to define morality "in terms of the formal characteristics of a moral judgement or a moral point of view, rather than in terms of content."¹⁴ Two pages later he says "...we can define a moral judgement as 'moral' without considering whether it agrees with our own judgements or standards."¹⁵ Kohlberg implies that at least for some aspects of morality (moral reasoning) all that is required in his scheme of things is that an individual at his stage six should judge on the basis of what he recognizes as a personal principle of conduct. Brian Crittenden feels such a criterion is open to the following objections;

It is simply not sufficient to know that someone acts typically on self-accepted principles of conscience. One must also inquire about the substance of the principles on which he acts. Perhaps they are not moral principles at all or are grossly bad ones. The principles' content must be related to issues and claims of human welfare, and it must be used as a guide for reaching a moral resolution of the competing claims of concrete individual human beings in concrete situations.¹⁶

For many people, the moral beliefs they have do partly determine what they recognize as 'human welfare' and these beliefs are likely to influence the weight given to considerations of welfare and the making of moral judgements. In these situations content is crucial.

Kohlberg tells us that the way to produce cognitive stimulation is by providing the individual with experiences of conflict or disequilibrium and then exposing him to the type of reasoning common to the next higher stage of development. It is

¹⁴Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 44

¹⁶Brian Crittenden, pp. 16-17.

not really clear in what way a moral conflict or dilemma makes individuals dissatisfied with their present level of reasoning. Turiel, an associate of Kohlberg's at Harvard, gives us this detailed explanation of the process of transition:

The process of stage change entails deformation of one structure through its formation into another structure.....Movement from one stage to the next is a process of rejection and construction: through an awareness of its contradictions and inadequacies, the logic of the existing stage is rejected and a new stage is created.¹⁷

This account is elaborated primarily in terms of the content of the individuals thought, not in the structural terms which are supposed to be the backbone of the theory. Kohlberg's own account is very similar:

Structural adaptation involves with each adaptive step a dual process of differentiating out of the situation new aspects not previously evident and a reintegration of all presently recognized aspects into a coherent whole which serves the same functions as the previous structure but supercedes it by virtue of its more satisfactory stage of equilibrium.¹⁸

The structural necessity of each step is never demonstrated. Both accounts fall back on a content analysis when a structural analysis is required.

The point of all the foregoing comments and arguments is first of all to show that content is a necessary and important part of moral functioning and that Kohlberg's moral theory does carry with it commitments on the content of moral beliefs and arguments. Teaching content is not only compatible with Kohlberg's

¹⁷E. Turiel, "Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development," Child Development, 45, 1974, p. 28.

¹⁸Lawrence Kohlberg, Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education, (Cambridge, Mass.: Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University, 1973), pp. 361-362.

stage theory but also required by it. His process of 'cognitive stimulation' will be enhanced by its inclusion.

Now we will turn to a more specific aspect of content, namely, the role of habit, to see how it can complement Kohlberg's theory.

Habit and Habituation.

Integrally connected with the force of moral content, is an important place for habits and habit training. Kohlberg claims that character traits and the processes by which they are established, are of only secondary consideration. He argues that this type of learning is short-term, situation-specific and reversible. Kohlberg's criticisms depend on the peculiarities of a particular class of character traits (e.g. honesty) and should not be used to brush aside all classes of virtues.

Because William Frankena feels that the terms character and virtue carry with them overly narrow moral connotations, excluding dispositions of intellect, he prefers the use of the term 'excellence' defined as:

an activity, action, experience or feeling; it is what Aristotle calls a hexis, and Dewey a "habit". A hexis is a disposition or dispositional property of a mind or person, something that need not be activated at a given time and yet may correctly be said to be present. One may know how to play chess when one is not playing it or even thinking about it. All such things as abilities, habits, skills, traits of character or personality are dispositions in this wide sense.¹⁹

Aristotle, like Kohlberg, assigned a central place to

¹⁹William Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1965), p. 2.

cognitive factors in moral education, but he also saw the necessity of assigning an important role to habits because he believed we acquire virtue by practice. He said we were given a capacity by nature to receive virtue and it is brought to maturity by habit.²⁰ Therefore it is vital for us to see that children are trained in the set of habits most worthwhile for the development of the type of morality, we wish to instill. William James would concur with that viewpoint. He says, "Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state."²¹ If it is true we cannot avoid forming dispositions, then it certainly makes a big difference what these dispositions are. We would obviously want to form the most desirable ones. So, Frankena says we must "first develop certain abilities, habits, and traits rather than others. These dispositions are not only necessary but desirable because they are the condition and underpinning of the good life. We must acquire them in order to put ourselves in the position of engaging in worthwhile activities if and when we choose to."²² He believes that they are the means which make it possible for us to have desirable experiences.

I have argued that the transmission of content is socially desirable. As explained by Dewey, society must be concerned to transmit:

habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the

²⁰Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 2. 1.

²¹William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. (New York: Henry Hold & Company, 1980), p. 127.

²²Frankena, p. 4.

older to younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive.²³

This leads us to what Peters refers to as the paradox of theoretical moral education, if on one hand, we concede to Kohlberg that a principled form of morality is more desirable than a conventional form. On the other hand we know that at a child's most formative years, "he is incapable of the principled form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on."

As Aristotle correctly pointed out, children cannot, in the early stages of their lives behave like a just person and act 'morally'. They can't grasp the abstract principle of justice and they can't yet question the validity of rules. Through Piaget's work we know that during the early years of development, children cannot be taught rules in a rational way through such processes as "explanation and persuasion which depend upon the ability to grasp a rationale."²⁴ The young child, in his conscience as in his logic, cannot be viewed as an adult in miniature. He must become habituated to following certain rules and firmly internalize them without yet understanding the validity of the reasons for them. Does this type of learning which precedes the learning of formal principles of morality prevent one from reaching that higher level? Or is it as Peters tells us that children "can

²³John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1916), p. 3f.

²⁴R. Peters, "Moral Development—a plea for Pluralism," p. 255.

and must enter the Palace of Reason through the Courtyard of Habit and Tradition."²⁵ It is the premise of this paper that a rational morality can develop out of a basis provided by early habit formation.

"Entering the Palace of Reason Through
the Courtyard of Habit and Tradition"

Many people have a problem accepting "habit" as a valid part of moral development because they regard it in a very narrow sense of the word. It brings to mind some single-track disposition learned through the process of drill, carried out more or less automatically or "out of habit", without any intellectual reflection.²⁶

First of all, a lot of the things we do are "out of habit" but this can serve an important purpose. This allows our mind to be free to attend to things more interesting and worthwhile. For example, take an activity which has some overall end, such as tennis. There are certain component actions, bending your knee, holding the racket, etc., which have to be more or less habitual for a person to be able to get on to the higher strategies of the game. And so it is in the moral sphere. How utterly exhausting it would be to have to reflect, deliberate and make decisions in every moral situation we encounter.

Secondly, habits do not have to be exercised out of force of habit or as a routine mechanization. Not all habits are

²⁵R. Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education," in Theories of Value and Problems of Education, ed. by Philip G. Smith (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 107.

²⁶Ibid., p. 108.

acts of automation or drill. John Dewey defines a second class of habits which he calls intelligent, having a "special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts."²⁷ Dewey believes that these habits are crucial, constituting the core of the self. They act like tools, providing the means and skills so we can carry out our activities. They have a special propulsive power or driving force which manifests itself in predispositions to act in certain ways. Dewey goes on to say about these habits, "in any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities."²⁸

Process of Habituation

By using a broader concept of the term habit and by concerning ourselves with the manner in which habits are formed, Peters says we can avoid any paradox of moral education. The term habituation can include a "wide class of learning processes in which people learn by familiarizing themselves with, or getting used to, things, and by repetition."²⁹ Not all processes of habituation are mindless drills.

Dewey says it is through the working harmony of reason and desire that habit can be of value in reasonable conduct. For

²⁷John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Random House, 1930), p. 42.

²⁸Ibid., p. 25.

²⁹R. Peters, "Moral Development—A Plea for Pluralism," p. 255.

habit to be reasonable and of optimal value there needs to be continuous reconstruction and adjustment to meet new arising circumstances. Our social environment is a complex structure. Habits will be formed at different and even conflicting levels which exist in it. When there is a conflict of habit, the ensuing release of impulses can be used to reorganize habit by supplying new directions for changes in quality, to take place. It is the impulses and passions which give us the alternatives we need to consider and our emotions establish information about the qualities of alternatives. The more passions and impulses we have, the better the balance and the more effective the relationship between reason and desire. There are ways of forming habits in which reason and intelligence play a major part. Initially, habituation can help by "laying down a pattern of response that may be used in the service of more appropriate motives at a later stage."³⁰ Encouragement of intelligent rule following is not all that can be done in the early stages.

According to Peters, a child can become sensitive to considerations which will later serve him as principles. For example, concern for others is much easier for children to grasp, and its development comes earlier. So if we can encourage such concern by exposing children to situations where an "other" might be suffering, their sensitivity may be sharpened. They can be encouraged to form the habit of paying attention to the plight of others. This habit is not a virtue in the full sense, but it

³⁰Ibid., p. 260.

can come to function later as part of one and might predispose children to be influenced by compassion on specific occasions.³¹ Habits can be formed intelligently in situations where there is some overall end or widely conceived objective. A stereotyped and routine pattern of movements is not allowed to develop because the situation involves changes. Habits formed here have to be adaptable. These adaptable habits, according to Peters, should include some of

the higher order scruples connected with reason, such as having regard to whether what is done is correct, taking care, checking and thinking of objections. These scruples are learned mainly by taking part in situations where actions and performances are criticized. Gradually, through a process of role playing, the learner becomes a constant critic of his own performance.³²

Intelligent habits are more readily formed when we deal with a certain class of virtues. Peters feels that habituation can have a special importance for a class of virtues closely connected with self-control. It has even been argued that all virtues are forms of self control.³³ Not having as restrictive an outlook as Kohlberg, Peters elaborates three additional classes of virtues, ignored by Kohlberg, which he feels are relevant to a reasoned morality.³⁴ Besides the class of situation-specific virtues recognized by Kohlberg, he says there is a class of virtues which include motives for action, or emotions, such as com-

³¹Ibid., p. 259.

³²Ibid., p. 256.

³³G. H. Von Wright, The varieties of goodness (London: Routledge, 1963).

³⁴R. Peters, "Moral Development—A Plea for Pluralism," pp. 247-248.

passion and pity. Essential to the exercise of these virtues is the arousal of feelings. Exercising these virtues our mind is actively working to bring about a certain state of affairs. His third class of more artificial virtues, which includes justice, and tolerance, involves more general considerations to do with rights and institutions. These have been labelled artificial because they involve much in the way of thought. There are a lot of considerations which need to be weighed and assessed.

Peters' final class of virtues are content-free and of a higher order. They include such traits as courage, integrity, perserverance and determination. These traits have to be exercised in the face of counter-inclinations. They prescribe no particular rules or purposes, as does honesty. This group of traits, Peters sees as being intimately connected with the will. If a person can understand what justice is, agree to it, and come to have it function as a principle for him, he will still need to call upon this class of virtues for the courage, determination, etc., to carry out what he believes is just. This class of traits is also connected with forms of rationality and would include what Dewey labelled intelligent habits.

It is in this last class that Peters feels habituation can play a crucial role in development. He says the more we become familiar, in such situations that are fearful or tempt us, both with the external features and the internal commotions, the more likely we are to be led by a variety of considerations to control our immediate responses.³⁵ This familiarity can carry

³⁵Ibid., p. 259.

over to situations in later life when the appropriate reasons can be better understood.

Children can prepare themselves, by going through the motions of self-control for the stage when they will have a more inward understanding of the reasons for the pattern of behavior they are exhibiting. Habituation is important both in familiarizing children with the features of such situations and in developing the relevant action patterns that will enable them to deal practically with the emotions that may be aroused instead of being overcome by them.³⁶

Kohlberg offers no account of how virtues involving self control are supposed to develop. Peters puts this question to him, "Does Kohlberg think that an individual can in fact adhere to his favored principle of justice when the screws are put on him, without some such training?"³⁷

Frankena's Twofold Approach to Virtuous Action

When considering this phenomenon of will and how it helps us adhere to a principle such as justice, it would be advantageous to look at what Frankena calls his twofold approach to the problem of producing virtue in the next generation.³⁸ The first job is that of content—handing on a "knowledge of good and evil" or "knowing how" to act. It deals with the formation of right ideas.

The second job is to ensure that children's conduct will conform to this "knowledge". This job deals with the formation of and the developing of dispositions which will lead one not only

³⁶Ibid., p. 250.

³⁷Ibid., p. 261.

³⁸William Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," in Philosophy and Education, 2nd ed., ed. by Israel Shaffer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), p. 238.

to ask what is right, but to act accordingly; to keep the youth from saying, "I can, but I won't."

There are different kinds of dispositions, the first of which Frankena labels moral virtues. These are habits of using "intellectual virtue", to determine what is right and choosing it on purpose because it is right. Another kind of disposition leads us to go beyond the call of duty in the sense that not only will we do good deeds because they are right but also because we want to. This second job also involves producing virtue in an individual so he will act in accordance with certain principles of right and wrong in spite of contrary temptations, conflicts of duty, or novel situations.³⁹ If, as Dewey claims, habits are will, this second job will be quite dependent on the processes of habituation. Frankena believes the cultivation of these desirable dispositions and the weakening of contrary ones (e.g. fear and hatred) has a proper place in moral education.⁴⁰ Kohlberg pays all too little attention to the intimate connection between right and wrong and caring.

Frankena's two "jobs" although analytically distinct from each other are not independent. They are two parts of a single process of moral education, which helps us to understand that there is no necessary opposition of habit and autonomy, as Kohlberg's limited concept of character traits led him to believe. To be successful in moral education, to get a person not only to

³⁹Ibid., p. 241.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 239.

be honest, but to be honest out of conviction, both Frankena's criteria need to be met. Is the cognitive sufficient to meet both criteria, or does this create a need and place for feeling and emotion?

A Need for the Non-cognitive: Emotion and Feeling

Emotion is often viewed only in terms of its effect on situational moral behavior rather than in terms of its role in long term development. When it is viewed as such, it is generally seen as an irrational force that causes people to be less than their best moral selves.⁴¹ Piaget, for one, would agree that strong emotion can be disruptive, interfering with operational thinking by causing the person to fix on one aspect of the situation; at the expense of other relevant considerations.

There is no general agreement as to whether the function of emotion is to organize or disorganize behavior. R. S. Woodworth views emotion as something we need to outgrow and to learn to live without as we develop better resources for dealing with life's situations.⁴² P. T. Young would agree with Woodworth's implication that emotion is essentially disruptive and something the well-adjusted adult can manage to live without.⁴³

The emphasis on the negative effects of emotion has more recently been balanced by research showing that the "warm glow of success" or "the reparative flush of failure" can lead to

⁴¹ William Sloan Coffin Jr., "Not Yet a Good Man," New York Times, June 19, 1973, p. 39.

⁴²R. S. Woodworth, Psychology, (New York: Henry Holt, 1940).

⁴³P. T. Young, Motivation and Emotion (New York: Wiley, 1961).

an increase in such prosocial behaviors as helping or sharing.⁴⁴ R. W. Leeper concedes that extreme emotion can be disruptive but that, in general, emotions organize behavior by arousing, sustaining and directing behavior.⁴⁵ M. Arnold criticizes the proponents of the disorganization theory for neglecting positive emotions such as love, affection and delight.⁴⁶

Richard Peters has argued that strong emotion in the form of the "passionate side of the life of reason" can be a force for stability and high moral conduct rather than an agent of moral downfall. He argues;

Rational people are able to do this [stand firm, say no to temptation, be impervious to social pressure] only if they are passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth and if they have a genuine respect for others and are intensely concerned if they suffer.⁴⁷

R. S. Lazarus says that we are accustomed, by a long standing tradition dating back at least as far to Plato, to blame emotion as the cause of irrationality.⁴⁸ He claims this is con-

⁴⁴D. L. Roseham, Bert S. Moore, and Bill Underwood, "The Social Psychology of Moral Behavior," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 219-240.

⁴⁵R. W. Leeper, "The motivational properties of emotions indicating their fundamental character and role," in Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium, ed. by M. B. Arnold (New York: Academic Press, 1970).

⁴⁶M. Arnold, Emotion and Personality, 2 volumes, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

⁴⁷Richard Peters, "Concrete principles and the rational passions," in Moral Education: Five Lectures, ed. by N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 51.

⁴⁸R. S. Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 250-251.

fusing cause and effect, the real culprit being the perceptual appraisal, the antecedent dispositions and cognitions which determine the emotional reaction. The reaction is irrational, only because it is based on such cognitive things as incorrect facts or an incorrect assessment of the facts.

The idea that intellectual analysis is, or can be, detrimental to morality is an old one, prevalent in Eastern religion. It has influenced Western thought through the work of Castañeda, Watts, and modern psychotherapists who feel that the stereotyped, cold, heartless intellectual exists too often in reality. They believe that rational analysis overrides, in too many instances, basic impulses to human decency, for example, the debate in the U.S. Defense Department over the number of millions of permissible deaths in a nuclear war. They also point out that people continually substitute words for action. During an intellectual analysis, there seems to be something that can be said for every position. Often the result of such an analysis is not any positive action but moral apathy. Science, the queen of intellectual analysis, is not very helpful in deciding what we ought to do in the moral domain. We should not expect an analysis of values and moral problems, in the absence of moral imperatives having sufficient emotional charge, to bring about desired moral behavior.

Norman Wallen believes that "when we are dealing with morality, we are.....dealing with behavior which is largely emotional. We abandon our early egocentric selves and become rule followers through processes of identification and social reinforcement, both having strong affective components. Development

of genuine caring, concern for social justice and self risk (if not sacrifice) requires powerful emotional experiences."⁴⁹

Wallen would be a proponent of Frankena's twofold approach as he also strongly believes in the importance of developing dispositions which lead us to act in accordance with what we know is right.

Wilson's place for the role of feeling

To give support to the idea of emotion being necessary for successful moral education, this paper will now take a look at the work of John Wilson. His doctrine makes a substantial place for the function of feeling in moral development. He feels that "morality is about what we ought to desire for its own sake, and not essentially about what we ought to do in order to achieve what we desire....The former is concerned with the appreciation of situations, with our feelings and our emotional reactions to them."⁵⁰

Wilson believes that the dispassionate examination of one's own feelings and attitudes constitutes the very essence of moral education. "Choosing what to do in morality can, in a loose sense, be said to include an examination of our feelings and desires: but the essential part of the process is not choice, but this examination itself. Hence, the essence of moral education

⁴⁹Norman E. Wallen, "Can Moral Behavior Be Taught Through Cognitive Means? No," in Social Education, Vol. 41, n. 4, April 1977, pp. 329-330.

⁵⁰John Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1969), p. 65.

is not the inculcation of right choices, but improvement and clarification of feeling: or, more precisely, it aims at the former via the latter."⁵¹

Therefore, according to Wilson the purpose of a moral dilemma is not to examine facts or logic. We should be imagining the consequences, and trying to perceive not only our feelings but those of other people as well. Wilson sees the peculiar function of morality as "bringing us into a right relationship with other people.....We should be able, so to speak, to get outside the rules, to inspect their point and purpose, and make decisions about them which must of necessity be based on something other than the rules themselves; that is, on the wants, wills, feelings, or interests of other people."⁵² To be successful at this, Wilson says you need the following moral components.

- 1) Phil: ability to identify with other people so that other people's feelings, wants and interests actually count as of equal validity to one's own.
- 2) Emp: insight into one's own and other people's feelings. Autemp is self awareness and Altemp is awareness of others.
- 3) Gig: mastery of factual knowledge. To make a correct normal decision you need gig, emp, and phil.
- 4) Dik: rational formulation of emp and gig, on the basis of phil, into a set of rules or moral principles to which the individual commits himself.
- 5) Phron: rational formulation of roles and principles relating to one's own life and interests.
- 6) Krat: ability to translate dik or phron principles into action.⁵³

To speak a little further on Wilson's second component, emp, it actually has five subcomponents.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., p. 51.

- 1) having the concepts of emotions, moods, , etc. You need to have the concept of an emotion before you can identify the emotion. Wilson's concept of an emotion has the following elements;
 - a) a belief
 - b) involuntary or partially involuntary symptoms (i.e. trembling, going pale), which include certain postures, gestures, facial expressions, etc.
 - c) intentional action (i.e. running away)
- 2) being able to identify conscious emotions in oneself
- 3) being able to identify unconscious emotions in oneself
- 4) being able to identify conscious emotions in others
- 5) being able to identify unconscious emotions in others⁵⁴

Awareness of other people's feelings is (both conceptually and in practice) bound up with awareness of one's own feelings. Wilson believes that moral actions and beliefs have to be defended by reference to the interests of other people: so that the 'morally educated' person must, of course, be aware of those interests. Therefore we cannot suppress or fail to be aware of our own feelings. This will distort our perception of other people.

Wilson stresses the development of perception, awareness of feelings, imagination, and human understanding because he believes "it is these features (amongst others) which differentiate rationality in morals from rationality in other human activities, such as mathematics or science."⁵⁵ What makes a reason a good moral reason to Wilson is that "it points to some facts in the external world which make it reasonable to commit oneself to a universalizable rule. These facts must relate to the interests

⁵⁴ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁵ibid., p. 90.

of other people."⁵⁶ In other words, according to Wilson, we enter the moral sphere when we make an effort to decide, by reference to other people's feelings and to the facts, what rule or moral principle we ought to commit ourselves to in this particular situation.

Wilson argues that the moral arena is wider than the area of actions which are assigned particular types of praise and blame. It also includes our general attitudes, feelings, ways of looking at the world and at other people, etc. Far from disregarding feelings and emotions as disruptive forces, he claims we must do them justice by understanding them with a view to our being able to use and control them for our own benefit.

Consideration for Others

Returning to the principle of justice which Kohlberg accords such pre-eminence, it demands impartial consideration of other people's claims and interests. Use of this principle implies something else is of value, or else how do we determine relevance. Peters believes that what is usually at stake is other people's welfare or interests and claims "it is no accident that occasionally Kohlberg slips in some reference to human welfare when he talks of his higher stages. So we have at least one more fundamental principle in the system—the consideration of people's interests."⁵⁷

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 98.

⁵⁷R. Peters, "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education," p. 150.

Although not fully accounted for in the Piaget-Kohlberg school of thought, McPhail's Lifeline program makes caring for others the pivotal point of its material.⁵⁸ McPhail sees emotion and habit as the greatest motivational forces. Although McPhail is criticized for catering to the needs of adolescents at Kohlberg's lower, rather than more principled, stages, he should, at the least, be applauded for emphasizing consideration for the needs, feelings, and interests of others in morality.

Martin Hoffman concerns himself with the developmental aspect of the "consideration for others" principle with which neither McPhail or Kohlberg deal. He has come up with a developmental theory of altruism which is consistent with Piagetian principles.⁵⁹ It is based on the assumption that man is innately capable of both egoistic and altruistic motivation. His aim is to propose a theory of how the latter may be developed in an individual. He believes that humans may even have a built-in predisposition for the capacity to experience the inner states of others who are not in the same situation, and therefore a predisposition for altruistic behavior. He would define altruism in this way; any purposive action on behalf of someone else which involves a net cost to the actor. To show that altruistic behavior may be based on other than selfish motives, Hoffman studied two types of altruistic behavior: (1) rescue or helping another in distress;

⁵⁸P. McPhail, J. R. Ungood-Thomas, H. Chapman, Moral Education in the Secondary School (London: Longman, 1972).

⁵⁹Martin Hoffman, "Empathy, role-taking, guilt, and development of altruistic motives," in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 124-143.

and (2) sharing or making an anonymous donation to someone in need.⁶⁰ Both he and Wilson have definite ideas about how to promote such prosocial behavior as altruism.

Development of altruistic behavior

Both Wilson and Hoffman would agree that the first step would be to acquire sensitivity to the needs and feelings of others. They need to be aware of the cues which serve as indicators of another person's experience of distress. Hoffman says that the best way to do this is to allow the child to experience normal distress experiences himself and not to overprotect. This can provide him with a broad base for both empathic and sympathetic distress in the early years.

The next step would be to provide the child with opportunities for giving help and responsible care to others and also to give role taking opportunities. If a child incorrectly interprets available cues, corrective feedback should be supplied. This second step should not only foster sympathetic distress and awareness of another's point of view, but should aid in the integration of the two. It is very beneficial to encourage the child to imagine himself in someone else's place and to point out the similarities as well as the differences.

The last step is actually an ongoing process; exposure for a long time to loved models who behave altruistically.

Altruistic behavior is first accomplished by means of

⁶⁰Ibid.

imitation. A child attaches positive affect to the behavior of an adult who indicates pleasure at some event. The child learns what to do to produce the signs of adult pleasure and willingly repeats it to obtain the same result. In the sense that this action benefits another, rather than oneself, it can be considered altruistic. This is not to deny that there isn't any ensuing affective benefit for the child. On the contrary, it is the positive affect induced by the consequences of one's actions for another person, real or imagined, which reinforces and sustains the altruistic behavior. These acts depend on the anticipation of affective outcomes such as feelings of pleasure, satisfaction, pride, etc. The emotions act as incentives. The anticipations are evoked by cues which have the capacity to do so due to prior association of experiencing the full affective state.

The affective component motivates behavior in the sense that the individual is stimulated to seek reward or to avoid aversive consequences. The arousal of positive or negative affect with regard to particular types of behavior is related to a learning process where evaluation of behavior is explicit (morals training) and where affective response is deliberately heightened, especially by the use of love-oriented techniques of punishment and by induction training where emphasis is placed on understanding and empathizing with the feelings that the effects of actions cause in others.⁶² This learning process involves sustained interaction with others and the transmission of an affective stance

⁶²J. Aronfreed, Conduct and Conscience.

with regard to particular forms and types of behavior.

Justin Aronfreed theorizes that the imitator forms a kind of 'cognitive template' of the model's behavior.⁶³ Positive reinforcement is provided by the imitator's degree of match between his behavior and his cognitive template. It is very important at this stage that a parent provide a positive considerate model. If a child is exposed for a long time to loved models (parents) who behave altruistically, and communicate their own thoughts and feelings as well as the presumed inner states of the persons they are helping, altruistic motives will be enhanced. This will also help the child acquire forms of overt behavior which are instrumental for altruistic behavior. Children need to be taught how to be good as well as how not to be bad.

In an analysis of how altruistic behavior is acquired, Aronfreed and Paskal did experiments involving 6 to 8 year old girls.⁶⁴ They were showed how to work an apparatus with two levers. One gave sweets, and the other produced a red light. In group A, when the red light was produced, a woman smiled and in a pleasant and excited way said, "There's the light!" These were expressive cues. Then she gave a hug with a big smile. This was called affection. In Group B, only expressive cues were given, and in group C, only affection.

⁶³Justin Aronfreed, "The Concept of Internalization," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by D. A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. 1969), pp. 263-324.

⁶⁴Ibid.

During the trials, the red light could only be seen on the experimenter's side, not the child's. So the situation was; produce sweets for yourself or produce signs of pleasure in the experimenter.

Results showed that group A chose the light level significantly more frequently. This experiment helps to show that children can learn to be altruistic by having pleasurable affect conditioned to both verbally expressed cues which appeal to a sense of reason, and overt affection. The fact that the other experimental groups, B and C, were less apt to produce altruistic behavior can lead us to conclude that reasoning (at whatever level) works better when in combination with other methods (in this case physical affection) to develop desired moral conduct.

Another study by Aronfreed and Paskal dealt with how sympathetic behavior is acquired.⁶⁴ This study was designed to show how negative affect in children could be conditioned to distress signs in someone else, and also to see how far children could learn to perform sympathetic (or altruistic) actions as a consequence of observing the action of a model who relieved their own distress. There were five separate experimental arrangements. The first situation dealt with classifying objects into one of three categories, house, dog, or school. The middle category, dog, was never to be the correct response. During half the trials, between items the child heard a loud, unpleasant noise through his earphones. A few seconds before this, the adult, also wearing

⁶⁴Ibid.

headphones, showed signs of distress by clasping her hands to her head. In the second phase of this first sequence, the adult wore no headphones and showed no signs of distress. But she told the child she might be able to shut off the unpleasant noise the child might still hear in the headphones. When the child did hear the noise, the adult, on her own choice box pushed the middle switch, dog, saying as she did so that it was to stop the noise. In the third phase, another child was brought in who was trained to show signs of distress at certain times. This child would clap her hands to her head as the adult had done and would stop if the first child pushed the middle switch. If not, the stooge kept her hands to her head for 5 more seconds. The second sequence was the same except the experimenter's signs of distress did not coincide with the child's hearing of the noise. In the third sequence, the noise was only of low intensity. In the fourth sequence, all was the same as the first except the experimenter showed no signs of distress and in the fifth, didn't even wear headphones. The purpose of the different arrangements was to see how far external observable signs of distress were necessary for sympathetic behavior to happen. Children in the first sequence showed a significantly greater degree of sympathetic behavior "indicating clearly the importance of the conditioning of feelings of distress to the signs of distress in others as a precondition for imitation of the experiment's sympathetic behavior.....Basically then, it is changes of affectivity of feeling

which motivate sympathetic behavior."⁶⁵

We use this study to help us argue for a more substantial place for the function of affect in a theory of moral development. It was shown here how important affective conditions are in influencing behavior. Cognitive representations were enhanced and clarified by the addition of these affective cues. Cognitions worked best in conjunction with affective elements.

Internalizing attitudes and behavior

The ultimate in moral development is to attain Piaget's highest level of autonomy where control of our behavior is internalized. It is another step closer towards completion of Frankena's two jobs. We would be doing good deeds, even in the face of temptation. Aronfreed and Reber define conduct as internally controlled if it can be reliably elicited in the absence of socializing agents, after having been acquired under the control of either direct response outcomes which were mediated by the agents or the display of similar conduct by the agents.⁶⁶ To put it simply, we are talking about the development of a working conscience, both with cognitive and affective components, so that in the absence of any external surveillance, a child will exhibit controlled conduct.

Developing internalizations will lead us to feelings.

⁶⁵Douglas Graham, Moral Learning and Development (London: B. T. Batsford, 1972), p. 170.

⁶⁶J. Aronfreed and A. Reber, "Internalized Behavioral Suppression and Timing of Social Punishment," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 1965, p. 4.

of guilt when we violate an internal standard. Freud called this conscience our superego, and considered it necessary in order to prevent one from doing wrong. The development of a superego eliminates the need for constant surveillance and threats of punishment. That is why children of harsh, punitive, demanding parents often do not form strong, moral standards of their own for evaluating the propriety of a given action. They make those judgements which will gain approval. Love-oriented control methods facilitate the internalization of moral standards.

There is a two step process in the negative suppression of undesirable behavior. First, anxiety, becomes attached to behavioral or cognitive items which are associated with the beginning of the transgression. Then positive value becomes attached to items associated with the reduction of anxiety. Timing of the aversive stimulation creating the anxiety, was found by Aronfreed to be crucial. It is most effective when it occurs at the beginning of the undesirable behavior.⁶⁷

Negative Motivations: Shame and Guilt

The energy to motivate has been considered part of the affective domain since the time of Plato.⁶⁸ We have just spoken to the question of what is needed in order to internalize control over our behavior. The first step involved anxiety becoming attached to the transgression. If the transgression is consciously

⁶⁷J. Aronfreed, "The Concept of Internalization."

⁶⁸See Plato: Republic 475 A-E 485 C-E, Phaedrus 249cff: Symp. 2045ff.

committed, the resulting reaction could be either shame or guilt.

Shame is associated more with an externally oriented attitude, moral sanctions are perceived as coming from outside the self as in Piaget's heteronomous level of development. James Gilligan develops the concepts of shame ethics and guilt ethics.⁶⁹ He explains a shame ethic as a value system where the most negatively valued experience is shame (or humiliation) and the most positively valued experience would be the opposite, pride. Shame implies that we are very sensitive to our own loss of self-esteem. Gilligan claims that shame ethics place a positive value on love of one's self, pride, egoism, and narcissism at the expense of altruism, sympathy and compassion.

Gilligan sees moral development as the transition from shame ethics to guilt ethics and claims that Kohlberg's data is in agreement with his conclusions. First of all, guilt is associated with an internally oriented attitude. Moral sanctions are perceived as being self determined as in Piaget's autonomous level. A guilt ethic is a value system in which the worst evil is pride and the highest good is humility. Guilt ethics have the opposite moral valuations of shame ethics. They value altruism, sympathy and compassion and devalue love of one's self.

Piaget, Kohlberg and Gilligan all found similar and supporting evidence of two moralities. Piaget developed his heteronomous (shame ethics) level and his autonomous (guilt ethics) level. Kohlberg's studies of the development of moral reasoning

⁶⁹J. Gilligan, "Beyond Morality: Psychoanalytic reflections on shame, guilt, and love," pp. 151-155.

also indicate the existence of two types of moral motives as evoked by his subjects in justifying their judgements about moral dilemmas. The first type of motive includes those for avoiding sanctions perceived as coming from others (what Gilligan calls shame) and the second, more advanced type of motive includes those to avoid sanctions perceived as coming from the self (what Gilligan refers to as guilt). Thus, Gilligan feels that Kohlberg's data is in agreement with his own conclusions that (1) the motive for morality is to avoid either shame or guilt and (2) the developmental trend is from an earlier shame-motivated morality to a later, guilt-motivated one.

Stage one has a true shame ethic motive which is to be on the side with the most power through conformity to power-figures. And Gilligan also argues for stage six having a true guilt ethics motive; to avoid self-condemnation from one's own conscience. The intervening stages he sees as representing "variations of a shame ethic, as they are motivated by concern with sanctions coming from others, combined with increasing sensitivity to guilt as one goes up the developmental ladder."⁷⁰

Gilligan is not the only one who argues that concepts of shame and guilt are necessary for, and compatible with, Kohlberg's theory of developmental stages. William Alston proposes that

a necessary condition of a person's taking a principle or rule to be moral is that it either be part of, or be associated with, a certain set of rules which he has internalized in early childhood in the special kind of way and with the special

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 153.

kind of emotional intensity that Freud describes as the establishing of the super-ego.....In order for one to be motivated to act in accordance with a moral principle, rule, or judgement, it must be the case that one anticipates (not necessarily consciously of course) that feelings of guilt would ensue on one's failing to act in accordance with it.⁷¹

He claims that we can still accept all of Kohlberg's contentions about how structural differences in moral reasoning and judgement make a difference to behavior, but it might still be the case that when one doesn't act in accordance with one's moral judgement, it is because that judgement lacks the extra push which stems from an association between transgression of it and guilt feelings.

Peters also cannot understand why Kohlberg makes no mention of shame as a motive for engaging in moral action when it could easily have fit in especially as stage three or four. Transgressors of what Kohlberg refers to as the 'good boy' stage of morality would feel shame if he is conscious of the fact that he has let his side down or not lived up to what is expected of him by his peers. Shame and self-respect are closely connected. Moral shame is prompted when one falls short of virtues that his plan of life encourages. In guilt we tend to focus on the infringement of claims of others and on injuries done to them, whereas in shame we are more sensitive to our own loss of self-esteem and our disappointment in being unable to live up to our own ideas. Peters says, "Whether we feel guilt or shame when we fail to live up to Kohlberg's principle of justice depends on how self-referentially we view it. We may even feel remorse which seems to be a mixture of guilt at

⁷¹W. P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's From Is to Ought," pp. 278-279.

wrong-doing and shame that we could be the sort of person to do such a wrong."⁷²

Nature of Reason

We have just spoken of two specific powerful affective states which motivate moral action, shame and guilt. To what degree do they, or any "passion", depend upon reason in allowing them to play such an important role in moral life and, vice-versa?

David Hume considers reason to be inert. It alone cannot motivate people to act. There is a group of passions without which the operation of reason would be unintelligible (e.g. the hatred of irrelevance, special pleading and arbitrary decree, or the love of clarity and order). Reason itself provides no considerations that move people to act. Passions are psychological entities which move people to act. These beliefs led him to state that reason is the slave of passions and can only operate in their service.

According to Hume, all chains of reasons always regress to some passion. When you get to the end of the line, when reasoning must stop, there will be some underlying passion. He gives as an example the reasons why someone might exercise.⁷³ You might say you exercise to keep healthy, and that you want to keep healthy because sickness is painful. Is there yet another reason why someone should hate pain?

⁷²R. Peters, "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education," p. 154.

⁷³David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1957), p. 111.

Hume claims that passions themselves are neither reasonable or unreasonable because he regards them as original existences. There are not a copy or representation of another existence and therefore cannot be themselves a contradiction of ideas, truth or reason. But since passions are accompanied by judgements they can be called unreasonable in one of two senses. First, if they wrongly suppose the existence of some object, or if the means we choose to some desired end are inadequate. But, he argues, it is actually the judgement, not the passion, which is unreasonable.

Hume sees reason as having influence over our conduct in only two ways. "Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us the means of exerting any passion."⁷⁴ Hume is saying then, that reason has a two-fold job. It's business is in prompting the passions and in analyzing the connections of causes and effects. Beyond this, it leaves off and the passions rule.

Hume acknowledges a special class of "calm passions" which he says are often mistaken for reason. When we are determined to some action by a calm passion (the love of life, or aversion of evil), it is often accredited to reason. But in actuality, the active force of these reasons is due to the tranquil, calm passions.

⁷⁴David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 459.

It is obvious to see that Hume allots these calm passions the place of honor in the direction of conduct. He is very sceptical about the powers of reason and says we must encourage the strengthening of the calm passions which will allow reason to do its work.

Interdependence

Although Peters applauds Hume for putting forward a view of virtue which did justice to its complexity, Peters feels that Hume put philosophers on the wrong track by contrasting reason and passions. Peters feels that this leads us to think of them as two separate entities and he challenges the idea of an independently operating rationality, i.e. independent of passions. Peters claims that Hume took too limited a view, both of reason and of the passions. Reason, to Hume, was "merely the ability to make inductive and deductive inferences."⁷⁵ And Hume used passion in rather a "technical, philosophical sense to speak of a state of mind such as fear or benevolence that moves people to act."⁷⁶ Although Hume acknowledged "that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions," he did not appreciate how intimately connected the two were, and certainly not in opposition.

As argument for this interdependence, Peter takes the example of a violent person who is not only resisting the claims

⁷⁵Peters, Reason and Compassion, p. 74.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 80.

on him, the claim that he reflect and calculate, but he is also resisting the influence of the sort of passions that underlie a different level of life. Peters gives us many examples of passions that act as a basis along with the demands of reason. The love of system, classification and order supports plans and rules in making inferences and generalizations. The hatred of contradictions and inconsistencies opposes lapses in generalizations and rules. Distinctive passions make it possible for us to be objective in the different spheres of reasoning; impartial consideration of claims, fairness, determination to get to the bottom of things, humility to be able to accept the fact that you might be wrong, and respect for another whose viewpoint, although different, is worth considering.

Wilson also emphasizes that reason is not opposed to feelings and emotions. They must work together. To Wilson, the criterion for a morally educated person is one who manifests consistently a unity of reflection, feeling, belief, and acting. Many aspects of personality have a direct bearing on moral behavior; development of such social and interpersonal skills as empathy, communication, and role playing; development of such personal skills as control of behavior, and so on. He makes a list of the aspects he believes are involved in following some overriding principle:

- 1) what concepts we have (of honor, honesty, etc.)
- 2) what concepts we think we ought to use in our behavior (rules or principles)
- 3) what feelings or emotions we have that support our belief that we should use these concepts and principles
- 4) what knowledge or awareness we have of the surrounding circumstances

- a) ability to identify not only our own but others' emotions
- b) knowledge of relevant "hard facts"
- 5) what social skills we have for dealing with people
- 6) whether we use the above in situations we are confronted within real life;
 - a) are we alert to the situation?
 - b) do we use full or partial use of our knowledge?
 - c) do we actually use the principle we claim as right supported by our feelings so as to make a sincere decision to act in a certain way, or do we use other principles.⁷⁷

As can be seen from Wilson's list, interaction between the various spheres of development, the intellectual, the emotional, the social, and sometimes even the physical is involved. The various aspects are all tied up with each other. Intellectual development may be retarded by some emotional disturbance, which in turn may be adversely affected by deficiencies in physical development. Need deprivation leads to preoccupation with the self and its own need, hopes and fears. A state of well being, though, facilitates moral development because the person is more open to the needs of others. Need fulfillment and strong conscience go hand in hand. There's a positive relationship between emotional security and altruistic behavior.

Most forms of poor personal or emotional development do lead to some impairment of capacities relevant to moral behavior. Affective (emotional) features have the power to either block or facilitate the development of mature moral stages. Take the case of the psychopath. His individual orientation towards other people, his incapacity to form an accurate and undistorted picture of events

⁷⁷John Wilson, Approach to Moral Education, (Abingdon: Farmington Trust, 1967), p. 36.

of the world around him, and his incapacity to control his impulses, gravely hinders his moral development. There is a minimal level of emotional development below which a person cannot fall without serious impairment of his ability to make responsible moral decisions and carry them out. There is also a minimal level for intellectual development.

A paranoic is another example of someone without a proper functioning of one or more of the aspects on Wilson's list. He is constantly misreading cues. His perception of a situation is structured in terms of limited purpose. He is also lacking in will and in the virtues (determination, integrity) connected with it. These shortcomings keep his level of reactions from being replaced by another level with its own cognitive and affective components.

Transformation of Affective Concepts Through Development

For any complete understanding and use of principles, concepts, or judgements, the individual must possess the affective structure consistent with the cognitive structure. And just as our cognitions go through restructuring and reorganization, so must our affective components.

Piaget explains that a child at the sensorimotor stage relates to human beings in a way that moves between respect and love. He does not know the purely intellectual meaning of these terms. They are felt and are a part of the way he relates to his social world during this stage. A child who is labelled at Kohlberg's stage 2 would not picture Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma about

stealing a drug to save his wife as a purely moral dilemma. He views it from a selfish or prudential basis. "If he loves her, he should steal. If not, why bother?" Since the "loved ones" group for such a child will be small, the individual, at this stage, relates the moral only to that limited group.

Respect and love are not eliminated with the further development of the child. Instead transformation of the concepts "respect" and "love" is directly implied by the development of the child to a higher stage. This transformation should not merely be transformation of the cognitive but also of the affective. As we mature the range of emotions which we can potentially experience widens, while the emotions themselves become more finely differentiated. This gradual differentiation of emotion is a process which commences in early infancy.⁷⁸ A new baby feeling only generalized excitement or quiescence is, by the age of two, clearly feeling distress, anger, fear, disgust, jealousy, affection and elation.⁷⁹ As we grow older motivations and interests become increasingly complex, the result being that the cues capable of eliciting emotion in us as adults are subtler and more numerous.

Emotions can vary in intensity with changes in one's knowledge or beliefs. A change in knowledge can, by itself, result in the restraint or the removal of an emotion. For example, if you're angry at someone for having done something and then you find out his actions were justified, then you (normally) are no

⁷⁸Geoffrey Yarlott, p. 54.

⁷⁹Bridges, "Emotional Development in Early Infancy," in Child Development, 3, 1932, pp. 324-341.

• longer mad.

A good example showing transformation and development to a high level can be found in the Crito.⁸⁰ Socrates rejects his friend Critro's offer of assistance to escape death. By rejecting Critro's assistance, Socrates seems to reject love of wife, children, and friends as the guiding force in determining his decision. But this should not imply that love is non-existent in his decision to abide by the laws and die. Rather Socrates is interesting in insisting that for him, there is a higher love—love of a certain type of life, love of truth and knowledge, love of human beings qua human beings. He is also claiming that his love for his wife, children and friends, puts particular requirements on him as a human being. His love is not merely a romantic expression or a matter of physical presence. We find in Socrates' life the transformation of love so that it is consistent with his principles. The affective was transformed as to be consistent with the cognitive..

Optimal Conflict

For these transformations and ensuing development to take place, theorists have agreed that there is some level of optimal conflict or tension which will promote it. Different theories perceive the value of optimal conflict differently. Structural theories, like those of Kohlberg and Piaget, have emphasized the importance of cognitive conflict. They say we must arouse internal contradictions in a person's own reasoning, and confront

⁸⁰Crito 44B.

him with optimally discrepant reasoning of others (one stage above his own). This will stimulate cognitive transformation, reorganization and movement to the next developmental stage.

My argument is not against the use of such techniques but the inadequacy of focussing only on cognitive conflict techniques to foster morality. To help a child develop the kind of principled moral system that no longer requires external supports, the child must be able to cognitively and affectively manage within an integrated social structure. We cannot slight affective substance which can be of inestimable value.

Mort LaBrecque has refuted those proponents of Freud who claim that people's intellectual functions are perfect, and, because people sometimes make errors, there must be some nonintellectual forces operating on judgement. LaBrecque has found that "people's intellectual functions are seriously flawed as is demonstrated when people make judgements about the most boring, uninvolved kind of stimuli.....Often the sources of inferential error are primarily cognitive or informational."⁸¹

The theory of cognitive dissonance shows us that in some cases of decision making and conflict our behavior influences our judgements instead of the other way around which is proposed in Kohlberg's theory. When two cognitions or cognitive elements concerning one's own behavior, feelings, or attitudes are not mutually consistent, they are considered to be dissonant. This doesn't

⁸¹Mort LaBrecque, "On Making Sound Judgements," Psychology Today, August, 1980, pp. 40-41.

necessarily mean contradictory, but incompatible. For example, if I am aware that smoking causes cancer but I am also a chain smoker, my thoughts are dissonant in the sense that awareness of smoking causing cancer should lead to non-smoking. This theory assumes that dissonance is unpleasant and the person will be motivated to reduce the state of dissonance by;

- 1) stopping smoking
- 2) or by changing his ideas about the probability of getting cancer. This would lead to a subjective viewpoint rather than an objective one.

People normally behave in ways consistent with their known attitudes. But if dissonance occurs and internal contradictions in a person's own reasoning are aroused, this theory predicts that our need to justify our behavior results in an attitude change often based on an inaccurate assessment. We acknowledge only those facts supportive of our behavior thereby creating a lop-sided viewpoint. Many subjects who cheat do the same thing. They concentrate on all the possible reasons that would justify their breaking of prescriptions. This increased consideration of extenuating circumstances might make their moral judgements seem more complex and likely to be judged at a higher level than they actually are.

It is important to keep in mind that conflict has innumerable connotations and affective elements attached to it. Motivation can determine, for example, the intellectual functions we use in making a judgement or the weight we give to relevant data (as was seen in cognitive dissonance theory). If we are interested in the intention of the individual to choose the better in the face of temptation, to follow through and act on his moral

judgement, and to understand the meaning of the judgement, we need only to refer back to Wilson's list, page 102, to see the involvement of strong affective components. The following examples could be deduced from such a list—interest to carry out the judgement in action, courage in the face of fear, hope, etc.

One of the important points this paper hopes to make is that if there is a slippage between moral judgement and moral action, it may very well be that the elements of the affective component necessary for the judgements to be manifested in behavior are not present in concepts and principles.

Development of the cognitive and development of the affective are more than just parallel processes and are far from being immune to each other. To separate them creates a falseness or distortion and a certain artificiality. This distortion is present in Kohlberg's overemphasis on the role and importance of the cognitive in his theory. The two processes interpenetrate each other. To think of the mind as divided between a cognitive and an emotional side is to employ an obsolete faculty mode of thinking few psychiatrists today would accept. Any working definition of values should include both cognitive and affective components, and not as separate entities.

Richard Peters says;

It can be argued that just as the stoic must make room in his system for compassion, so the Christian must make some room for the influence of reason. There can occur great differences in emphasis....and the real tension is between the generalized demands of reason and the particular promptings of compassion.the complex content of moral life can be unified to a certain extent by a form in which reason and

compassion can be combined with varying degrees of intensity.⁸²

The use of reason is a passionate business and passions can be more or less reasonable. As Martin Scheerer put it, "behavior may be conceptualized as being embedded in a cognitive-emotional-motivational matrix in which no true separation is possible. No matter how we slice behavior, the ingredients of motivation-emotion-cognition are present in one order or another."⁸³ No matter how complex the cognitive operation, affective mechanisms exercise control to some degree. We do not shift into a totally cognitive (or totally affective) realm when we need to make a moral decision. Cognitive structures can only effectively control behavior along with the affect that has become attached to the consequences of that reasoning and to the representations which are arrived at as a conclusion of reason. Although the cognitive definition of a moral situation is vital, it is influenced to a greater or lesser extent by affective and motivational factors, and our feelings themselves depend in part upon our definition of the situation. Cognition and affect can never be completely separated because one is, in large part, the effect of the other.

Conclusion

I have been trying to show that no matter how important Kohlberg's theory of moral thought and reason may be, his theory and evidence do nothing to show that affect habit and content are

⁸²R. Peters, Reason and Compassion, p. 94.

⁸³Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I. ed. by G. Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 123.

not also important to morality in ways he chooses to ignore. Alston attributes his denial of the importance of these other aspects at least in part to his concentration on moral dilemmas. Being situations where there is no clear-cut solution in terms of overriding cultural standards, this is exactly where reasoning appears prominent (at least at surface level) over affect and habitual response.

In the initial phase of this section I argued for a substantial place for content in moral education and that such an approach is not only compatible with but also necessary for a theory of moral development through cognitive stimulation. Kohlberg's stages can be properly conceived as stages of habits of moral reasoning. We use habit concepts at any level but they are of special importance at the pre-conventional and conventional levels where in order to have working principles at a later rational level, we need in these stages to internalize and become habituated to following a certain set of rules.

The theoretical 'paradox of moral education' creates a substantial place for the use of habit and habituation in moral development. Children at earlier stages of development can learn to follow rules and to internalize them, but they are not yet capable of grasping the abstractions necessary for a principled level of morality. In other words, for this principled level of morality to later occur we must begin by paying special attention to the kind of habits we want to develop and what moral content we want to help us do the job. These two components do not need to be later thrown out the window when the principled level is

reached." Although they will take a back seat position, they are still there supporting and sustaining our use of abstract principles. If habits are learned in an intelligent way there is no reason for any paradox to materialize in the moral sphere. Habits can be learned in open-ended situations, in situations requiring change and restructuring, and in other intelligent ways which can enable the child to enter the 'palace of reason through the courtyard of habit and tradition.'

But formation of the right habits and ideas is not the whole story. We argued that not only must we do what is right, but we must care that what we do is right. This led to our discussion of affective components, and how indispensable they are in the complete picture of moral development. Affective components are especially important when we speak of motivating actions, carrying out judgements in the face of counterinclinations, and developing altruistic behavior in general. Kohlberg's emphasis on the principle of justice as the principle of principles, causes him to ignore other fundamental principles which are needed even in his own system, e.g., consideration of others. The interests of others is a very important consideration in making a moral judgement. To be 'successful' in the moral sphere includes having insight into one's own and others' feelings. The very nature of reason implies a direct interdependence between what has been called 'passions' and reason. We cannot work for the development of one without considering the development of the other. Our goal then should be to strive for a working harmony of the two.

CHAPTER III

Schools: A More Appropriate Approach
to Moral EducationIntroduction

The aim of this part of the study is to take a brief look at the more practical side of moral development—its place in a school curriculum. What role should the school play in fulfilling the needs and objectives of the non-cognitive features as well as the cognitive? First, the paper will take a look at what's been done in the past to meet affective needs and objectives, and examine why there were problems in this area. Then the paper moves on to make some suggestions of its own. Because a basic premise of this study is that the cognitive and affective are deeply intertwined and supportive of each other, there was no attempt to create a list of separate objectives for each domain. What is called for, is a curriculum which can simultaneously work at fulfilling the needs and objectives for both. It is important to give affective objectives more recognition and importance than in the past when it was just hoped that somehow emotional needs could be satisfied, while teachers concentrated on developing the intellect. The school, if used correctly, can be a very efficient institution in promoting successful moral development. This calls for a much broader conception on its part in fulfilling

all the needs and objectives of moral development. M. V. C.

Jeffreys puts it this way;

A human being is, or ought to be, a whole organism; and what affects one part affects the rest also. It is the business of education to foster growth of balanced whole persons. If education is deficient on the side of feeling, it is bound to be defective on the intellectual side; the resulting intellectual life will tend to be arid—it will, so to speak, lack body.¹

In the Past

Deciding on what objectives should exist and how they can be met is an enormous task, especially for affective considerations. In the past, these objectives in general emphasized a feeling tone, an emotion, or a degree of acceptance or rejection. They varied from simple attention to selected phenomena, to complex, but internally consistent, qualities of character and conscience. Terms common to the literature were interests, attitudes, appreciations, values, emotional sets or biases.²

Classifying objectives for affective purposes was found to be a great deal more difficult than for the cognitive. The statements of affective objectives lacked clarity. It was very difficult to find an ordering principle as simple and pervasive as that of complexity which had worked very satisfactorily for cognitive ends.

¹M. V. C. Jeffreys, Personal Values in the Modern World (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1962), p. 129.

²D. Krathwohl, B. Bloom, & B. Masia, Taxonomy of educational objectives: The Affective Domain (New York: McKay, 1964), p. 7.

Despite these difficulties, originally affective objectives were frequently given as much emphasis as cognitive objectives. What then occurred was a type of erosion of these objectives and good intentions. They were badly neglected. People were content to ignore them and eventually forgot they ever existed. Why did this gradual decay happen?

The main reason was that people found it much easier to teach and evaluate cognitive objectives which were much more clear-cut and obvious. We know a great deal more about how to teach some highly complex idea than we do about inculcating such simple beliefs as honor. Appraisal and evaluation techniques for affective objectives were often inadequate or even completely absent. Another problem was with the immediacy of results.³ Many items in the affective domain, interests, attitudes, and personality characteristics develop relatively slowly and would only be visible over long periods of time.

Another reason people let affective objectives erode comes from somewhat deeper philosophical and cultural values. Cognitive achievement is considered fair game for grading purposes. Achievement, competence, productivity, etc., are regarded as public matters. But examiners hesitate to grade students with respect to their interests, attitude or character development. One's beliefs, attitudes, values and personality characteristics, in most cases are considered private matters. Too many people were afraid that any attempt to persuade an individual

³Ibid., p. 18.

to accept a particular viewpoint or belief, to act in a particular manner or to profess a particular value or way of life would be seen as indoctrination.

The erosion took place, and many in the field were not even concerned. Educators have often felt that the attainment of a goal in one realm would lead to the attainment of the goal in the other. For example, we try to develop an interest in the student for the material so he'll learn to use it. Or, information and facts are presented to the student in hopes that his attitude will change. Because learning research and theories focus largely on cognitive behavior, moving in the cognitive domain to meet cognitive objectives with the implicit belief that there would be a corresponding development of appropriate affective behaviors, seemed to be much more common.⁴

Developing Appropriate Affective Behavior

Phillip Jacob's research has indicated that affective behaviors develop when appropriate learning experiences are provided for students, much the same as cognitive behaviors develop from appropriate learning experiences.⁵

Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia go so far as to say "that under some conditions the development of cognitive behaviors may actually destroy certain desired affective behaviors and that instead of a positive relation between growth in cognitive

⁴Ibid., p. 20.

⁵p. E. Jacob, Changing Values in College (New York: Harper, 1957).

and affective behavior it is conceivable that there may be an inverse relation between growth in the two 'domains'.⁶

They use the example of a literature course which, although it may instill knowledge of the history of literature and knowledge of the details of particular works, may at the same time produce an aversion or at least a lower level of interest in literary works. In some instances though, it is impossible to tell whether the affective goal is being used as a means to a cognitive goal or vice versa. It is somewhat of a chicken and egg proposition.⁷

Simultaneously with cognitive

Perhaps in these situations it is fairest to say that objectives from both domains are being sought simultaneously. Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia compare it to a man scaling a wall using two ladders side by side, each with rungs too far apart to be easily reached in a single step.⁸ One ladder represents cognitive behaviors and objectives, the other affective. The rungs of one ladder fall between the rungs of the other. So a cognitive skill is built and then used in a rewarding situation so that the affective interest in the task can lead to the next cognitive objective and so on.

A lack of noncognitive development (i.e. lack of sensitivity, lack of concern, lack of emotional development) can

⁶Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, p. 20.

⁷Ibid., p. 59.

⁸Ibid., p. 60

retard or prevent cognitive insights. And conversely, we would be hindered in our efforts to help a person become more sensitive to other people and their needs if there is a lack of understanding of the place of concern for others in a person's life. This is why the approach this paper is recommending is the joint seeking of affective and cognitive goals, resulting in a curriculum where use in one "domain" is a means for use in the other. Meeting the different needs and objectives of each "domain" should not be done on a separate basis, but rather on a closely knit alternating basis.

Children need to develop not only intellectually but emotionally as well if they are to become fully functioning and psychologically whole human beings. We are directly implying the need for the achievement of an integrated identity through a holistic or interactive approach.

When reason and emotion are treated as separate entities which need to be balanced, it seldom leads to anything more than time tabling blocks of humanities subjects which are to take care of all emotional needs, against time slots for the sciences. Education of feelings and emotions does not turn on and off when a student walks in and out of an arts lesson. Science and the practical subjects are potentially capable of playing a much greater role in affective education than has been generally assumed. Still, for many, we are led to believe that any such 'interactive approach working toward common goals of the two 'domains' would not be well received.

Pandora's Box?

The affective "domain" has been labelled by Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia as a "Pandora's Box."⁹ In it are objectives once stated confidently and then allowed to erode away. In it are objectives least likely to be agreed upon, not only by the school but by society itself. In consequence, much of this domain has been "repressed, denied, and obscured."¹⁰

But also in this box are many influential controls. The affective "domain" "contains the forces that determine the nature of an individual's life and ultimately the life of an entire people. To keep the 'box' closed is to deny the existence of the powerful motivational forces that shape the life of each of us. To look the other way is to avoid coming to terms with the real."¹¹ In the education of children we must keep in mind the "lifelong influence of attitudes internalized during childhood.....a gradual accumulation of preferences, compulsions, and rejections eventually forms our lifestyle. As the first evidences of organized behavior, they precede the development of rational thought."¹²

Emotional Attitudes

The distinction between aroused emotion and emotional

⁹Ibid., p. 91

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health, quoted in J. Junell, Conflicting Conceptions of Curriculum, p. 108.

attitude, or as G. Pitcher, refers to them, emotions in the dispositional sense, has to be clear. An aroused emotion is only short lived and can only endure for a minimal length of time. But an emotional attitude can continue so as to influence a person's future behavior over a long period of time.

"An emotional attitude may be regarded as an enduring tendency or disposition to react emotionally whenever a certain object or type of situation presents itself. For long periods, it lies dormant or latent, but, whenever stimulated by the appropriate set of circumstances, emotional arousal tends to recur and with each recurrence of arousal the emotional attitude becomes more deep-rooted."¹³ The interest to resolve a moral dilemma can be characterized as an emotional attitude. Whatever it is that exists in an emotional attitude, it must be some subjective element, involving cognition and memory, which is capable of influencing future behavior. G. Pitcher would agree. He would refer to his criteria for 'emotion situations' which state that the person must have made some cognition and some evaluation for it to be more than just a passive emotion. Emotions are almost always directed toward something, they have targets, not just causes. Wilson holds that these "active" emotions do have a cognitive core. Some form of apprehension of the target or object would be a bare minimum condition for having an active emotion. What other characteristics or features are there? In his explanation, G. Pitcher

¹³Yarlott, p. 66.

uses the term emotion-situation.¹⁴ He says an important characteristic is that the person acts or behaves, or at least has the inclination to act or behave in certain ways. Although further removed from immediate action but still salient characteristics are such things as wants, desires or beliefs. Pitcher groups all these together under the artificial heading of evaluations. He maintains that having some apprehension (cognition) and making some evaluation are characteristic features of emotion-situations.

There are two basic important elements, then, of an emotional attitude; (1) the memory of previous experiences and (2) certain structural dispositions.¹⁵ Affective memories greatly influence our intuitive appraisal of a situation and can eventually harden into an attitude of acceptance or rejection. These attitudes prove indispensable for daily living—if one had to wait until something actually hurt us before we deemed it bad, life could get very unpleasant.

Apart from those attitudes stemming from previous experience, "individuals also develop value-determined attitudes which presuppose systems of moral or ethical judgement. These attitudes are usually socially or culturally acquired."¹⁶

¹⁴G. Pitcher, "Emotion" in Education and the Development of Reason, ed. by Hirst, Peters, Dearden (Boston: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1972), pp. 368-387.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶E. Bedford, Emotions, quoted in G. Yarlott, Education and Children's emotions: an introduction, p. 67.

According to Junell, an attitude can be compared to an act of dependence, dependence on the quality of experience which brings elements of pleasure and pain, or more often, dependence on "specific human models or types, fictional or real, with which the learner establishes a strong emotional affinity and whose characteristic behaviors he uncritically accepts and makes a part of his own way of perceiving the world."¹⁷ This correlates with Aronfreed's views on the importance of imitation in the early acquisition of altruistic and sympathetic behavior.

We, as educators, need to be interested in these dispositional emotions or attitudes. Junell puts it this way:

Because attitudes function in the peculiar way they do, the emotions of young children must be made the primary target of public education, and the educator who wishes to improve the human condition without full recognition of this fact is merely whistling in the dark. He must be able to distinguish between attitudes which are liberating and those which are imprisoning; between ones which most fully able the child's imagination to run free and those which slam the door shut on him so that often he stands outside it, not even wondering what lies beyond.....He must have some inkling, finally, of the forces which affect attitudes and the important principle under which these forces operate.¹⁸

Place of Habit/Habituation

For the development of the 'right' attitudes to take place I will now argue for a role and place for the processes of habit and habituation, and then elaborate on a component brought out in a previous quote from J. Junell, namely imagi-

¹⁷Junell, pp. 109-110.

¹⁸Ibid.

nation. I will also discuss how it can promote successful attitude formation.

Already mentioned as an important element for attitude formation is the memory of previous experiences. The power to learn from experience means the formation of habits. Dewey says, "Habits give control over the environment, power to utilize it for human purposes."¹⁹ Hume also stresses the importance of experience. He says it is necessary, if we are to form adequate abstract ideas and principles, to have the custom or habit of mind, to see one member of a certain class resembling another as circumstances require and therefore applying the same name. Further along, Hume implies that we must keep in mind that reason, directly and indirectly rests upon habit and custom.

For habits to be valuable, they need continuous reconstruction and adjustment to meet new arising circumstances.

Dewey explains that;

habits take the form both of habituation or a general and persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background of growth; the latter constitute growing.²⁰

We are obviously not talking of routine habits or ones formed mechanically. Doing things "out of habit" means an arrest of growth, whereas active habits "involve thought, invention, and

¹⁹John Dewey, "Education as Growth," in Philosophy of Education, ed. by W. Frankena (New York: MacMillan, 1965), p. 21.

²⁰Ibid.

initiative in applying capacities to new aims."²¹

Education should be a constant reorganizing, and reconstructing of experience. Active habits require a certain social environment in which to act. This type of habit formation involves interaction between the organism and the environment.

The school can supply the specific environmental support necessary. It can "create a desire for continued growth and supply the means for making the desire effective in fact."²² The school can organize the powers that ensure growth. So often we fail to take into account the instinctive powers of the young. For example, it is assumed that young children can't identify with social issues involving even the most fundamental human rights.²³ But even at their early ages they have felt such issues as rejection (from friends, teacher), isolation, etc. at a very personal level, and this could serve as a basis for opening their eyes to issues of human rights. A second common failure is the failure to develop initiative in dealing with new situations. Also, if we wish to ensure growth we must avoid an undue emphasis upon such devices as drill at the expense of the development of personal perception.

Cultivation of Imagination

Active habits and moral growth will be fostered and enhanced by the cultivation of imagination which Elizabeth

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Junell, p. 111.

Simpson sees as "the use of the power to create which increases the sense of environmental mastery and self-esteem."²⁴ In her research, Simpson has found that this use of nonrational processes can promote the development of the sense of competence and self-esteem which, in turn, become the basis for intellectual, social, and moral growth.²⁵ For example, such creative processes as: working with paints, crayons, or clay, body movement, guided fantasy or simply unfettered verbal communication, have been used by therapists for the benefit of their clients.²⁶ Inspiring creative thinking through the use of art can bring about changes in the individual's self-concept and interpersonal concepts.

Just as one cannot aid in the development of emotional skills and skills of the imagination without reference to their integral cognitive counterparts, one also cannot effectively aid in the development of cognitive skills without reference to their integral emotional and imaginative counterparts. The work of Kohlberg and his colleagues gives support for an important relationship between imagination and generalized moral development.²⁷ He found that children tend to prefer

²⁴E. Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior" in Moral Development and Behavior, ed. by T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), p. 163.

²⁵E. Simpson, "The integrated person: cognitive development and the creative unconscious" (paper presented at the Second International Conference of Humanistic Psychologists, University of Wurzburg, Germany, July, 1971).

²⁶Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior," p. 163.

²⁷J. Rest, E. Turiel, and L. Kohlberg, "Relations between

levels of moral thinking above their own stage of development even though they would not understand if it was more than one stage above their own. So their choices seemed to be based on "imaginative reaching rather than on reasoning."²⁸ The studies of J. H. Flavell show just how deeply nonrational processes are embedded in the development of biosocial cognitive skills.²⁹ In studying the role taking of children between ages 8 and 10, he found that imagination plays an integral role in the cognitive reorganization of these children and it is used instrumentally in the application of new modes of thinking to solve interpersonal problems. Children do develop the ability to imagine themselves in someone else's place. By age 10, they can also understand that role taking functions reciprocally and someone else might at the same time be able to imagine his point of view too. Empathy, it is learned, can be one-sided, two-sided, or a transactional process.³⁰ Kohlberg doesn't use the term 'imagination', but in his theory higher levels of moral thinking do require imaginative thinking. The capacity to imagine, to project oneself into the being of others, is required.

Simpson says we can think of imagination as providing us

level of moral judgement and preference and comprehension of the moral judgement of others," Journal of Personality, 37, 1969, pp. 225-252.

²⁸Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior," p. 164.

²⁹J. H. Flavell, P. Botkin, C. Fry, J. Wright & P. Jarvis, The Development of role-taking and communication skills in children (New York: Wiley, 1968).

³⁰Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior," p. 168.

with a tentative morality.³¹ It allows one to assume a point of view and a set of values so we can test them out, explore them, before any permanent commitment is made, we consider what would happen if we did this or that; we try to perceive our own feelings and those of other people. Wilson claims our imaginations give us a "chance to react psychologically to the facts in a more efficient, or more discriminating, or more honest way."³²

Not only can imagination serve as powerful tool for cognitive development because of its integrative function but because it is an individual process. It makes each person see through his own eyes and his own perceptions. Even though the content may be culturally defined, fantasy is an individual act, incapable of being produced externally. Simpson believes a collective morality is one to be avoided as it is destructive to individual morality, leading "to the loss of personal integrity and to individual exculpation through the foisting of blame onto others."³³

Our curricula need places for imagination in every sphere but especially in the moral sphere. Clive Beck suggests that one reason a lot of people do not develop morally is because

³¹Ibid.

³²Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 65.

³³Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior," p. 168.

better alternatives do not occur to them.³⁴ It is up to us, as educators, to extend students' imaginations. For example, D. C. McClelland did some interesting work where individuals were taught to fantasize about doing things well and then these images were tied in with reality.³⁵ Fantasy can also serve as a safe outlet for antisocial feeling, in lieu of the actual behavior. Simpson argues;

Why shouldn't imagination be utilized deliberately and purposefully in the moral sphere? The creative unconscious is an ally of the conscious, cognitive mind, and not its enemy in the battle to recognize evil and destructiveness and to deal appropriately with them.³⁶

Role of Teacher

For imitation and identification, and therefore later attitude formation, and also hopefully altruistic behavior to occur we need to establish an atmosphere which generates trust along with the security of believing that one can express emotions without losing respect or affection.

The teacher obviously has a very important role in creating the correct atmosphere in the classroom. Teachers have specialized in and gotten very good at extrinsic learning (as opposed to intrinsic learning—growing into the best human

³⁴Clive Beck, "The Development of Moral Judgement" in Developing Value Constructs in Schooling: Inquiry into Process and Product, ed. by James A. Phillips, Jr. (Worthington, Ohio: Ohio Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1972), p. 44.

³⁵D. C. McClelland, J. W. Atkinson, R. A. Clark, E. L. Lovell, The Achievement Motive (New York: Appleton, 1953).

³⁶Simpson, "A Holistic Approach to Moral Development and Behavior," p. 168.

being one can be.) The teacher does not need to be a psychotherapist. It is not necessary to explore the highly personal emotional life of students. He needs to be able to create a setting where emotional expression with regard to moral issues is free from inhibitions and fears. The teacher as a model, should be joyful and self actualizing. He can overshadow distorted patterns of behavior of the parents if his are healthier and stronger.

The teacher needs to accept what each child is and build upon his particular talents. First, he must help the child to learn what kind of person he is already—what's his style, his aptitudes, what he is good for, not good for, what can be built upon his raw materials, his good potentialities, etc. The atmosphere must be non-threatening and one of acceptance which reduces fear, anxiety and defense to the minimum possible. J. Junell feels that if the teacher were to possess but one dominant trait that it should be a spirit of reverence for children.³⁷ If a teacher has a positive regard, consistency, openness and caring, this brings the child out, permits him to express, to act, to experiment, to make mistakes, to let himself be seen. Of course suitable feedback will be required.

Junell also sees as an important talent the capacity for the teacher to act as a dramatist, placing rational processes, whenever possible, within an emotional context, using such tools as narrative, conflict and denouement. We have

³⁷Junell, p. 111.

already argued that real moral issues need to be seriously confronted. Here the teacher needs to take on the role of social critic. It is possible for even small children to identify with social issues dealing with fundamental rights such as social justice, cruelty to animals, pollution of the environment, etc. The teacher must be liberal minded enough to be trusting and accepting of others so that there will be a genuine expressing of feelings generated from a discussion and involvement with real moral issues. This type of situation would also provide for an intellectual analysis of what individual students really want in relation to the issues. As part of his role, it is up to the teacher to draw some conclusions for the learners rather than leaving things hanging. For "in order for attitude formation to occur, teachers must espouse the arguments which favor the attitude we wish to instill."³⁸

Content

In the last chapter I gave argument to show just how important moral content is in general moral development. In the interpersonal sphere of morality there is a basic content which every child must master out of necessity. Disagreement about the content is not so prevalent as one might first suppose. There are certain basic rules and principles which are

³⁸Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology, quoted in J. Junell, "Is Rational Man our First Priority?" p. 111.

not controversial and for which I believe there could be ample moral justification. For example, rules to do with noninjury, property and contracts such as; be honest, don't injure or purposely cause pain, don't cheat, don't discriminate against others because of color, creed or sex, etc. Children can also learn very easily that rules have reasonable exceptions and what they are.

With the development of imagination, depth can be given to the content of rules and principles so that we can come to understand the various forms of worthwhile activity and personal ideals not only in general but in relation to the capacity of certain individuals. A depth or breadth of understanding can also help us to be critical of the wideranging content we will be faced with. Wilson calls this "getting outside the rules" so as to inspect their point or purpose. Our decisions about them will not be based on the rules themselves but, on the wants, feelings, or interests of other people." For example, we need to question when we as individuals need to make exceptions to rules, or what rules are to be prevalent in our group and what expectations we ought to have of each other or what sort of individuals we ideally should be.³⁹

An educator can act as a socializer teaching value content and behavior, in other words, he can include some for of 'indoctrination' without violating the child's rights, as long as

³⁹J. Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 166.

there is an explicit recognition of shared rights of teacher and student, and as long as teacher advocacy is democratic or subject to the constraints of recognizing student participation in the rule making and value upholding process. Peters calls for "a predictable type of environment.....together with an accepting attitude towards the child,"⁴⁰ which can "provide conditions under which he can be secure and be disposed gradually to adopt a more reflective attitude towards rules."⁴¹ General development occurs when challenges calling for new adaptive responses confront the individual who has been freed from the necessity of maintaining unconscious defensive devices. In such an atmosphere standards can be set without the child developing a negative view of himself.

An approach to moral education which places exclusive emphasis on the development of a rational form of morality and thereby deeming content unimportant, carries with it a kind of abstractness and unreality. As C. Hamm points out, "Moral Education does not need to flounder for lack of agreed upon virtues."⁴²

Conclusion

We need methods of combining affective reaction and cognitive analysis.. Strong emotions evoked in a context wherein

⁴⁰Peters, Reason and Compassion, p. 68.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Hamm, p. 44.

the intellect can make sense out of what is happening is optimal. After an honest exchange of emotion in a climate of acceptance, one's reaction to an adversary or presumed enemy can drastically change. People rarely give ground on their emotional attitudes in a confrontation situation no matter how untenable their position is. If someone feels coerced into changing their convictions, he may even become more stubborn about preserving them as his self-esteem has become threatened. As Junell argues, "Facts have relatively little impact on the man who has already made up his mind.....It takes an overpowering array of facts to change the minds of people who are set in a belief that has emotional significance."⁴³

You cannot compel a person to give up his emotional prejudices; you can only create a situation and atmosphere in which by comparing his attitudes for himself against the attitudes of others, he will be disposed to modify or relinquish them voluntarily.

School can provide a fresh context, freed from the emotional associations of the home, in which new attitudes can emerge and take shape. The school should have an atmosphere of experimental discovery where the children can test out immature opinions and attitudes in safety. The teacher's and other children's emotional reactions can be used as validating data. Often in situations where there are conflicting attitudes, a person or group can devise 'higher level' solutions acceptable

⁴³Lee J. Cronbach, Educational Psychology quoted in J. Junell, "Is Rational Man our First Priority?" p. 109.

to all, if a solution is the goal rather than a 'win'. A model for the solution of moral problems can emerge.

The goal of the school then in creating optimal conditions would be the acceptance of all views and emotions with the teacher clarifying feelings and positions. Moral issues can be resolved by accepting strong emotional reactions (physical violence excluded); examining the real dynamics of the conflict and seeking the most humane solution.

Conclusion

The aim of this last part of the paper was not to set up a detailed curriculum for moral education in the schools, but merely to point future work in that area in the right direction. I took a look at the problems encountered in the past in obtaining a balanced program of moral education, in the hopes that the same difficulties could be avoided in the future. Educators were bogged down and discouraged by the difficulties in grading and evaluating affective objectives because they attempted to do so in the same manner as for cognitive objectives.

The paper stressed the importance of providing appropriate learning experiences for the development of affective goals as well as cognitive. This needs to be done on a closely knit alternating basis. Any attempt to isolate the two domains into separate entities was discouraged.

Schools were encouraged to establish a climate wherein students feel free to express their opinions and feelings about real moral issues. The teacher is to act as a guiding, suppor-

tive force, not an indoctrinator or judge.

The school cannot afford to keep the lid closed on 'Pandora's box' of affective objectives, since as Jeffreys says, "if education is defective on the side of feeling, it is bound to be defective as a result, on the intellectual side."⁴⁴ A school curriculum must have a more interactive approach if an integrated individual is the desired end product. Much too important to be ignored is the content; what exactly we are trying to instill in future generations. Habits and habituation can have a value in helping create the right atmosphere and prerequisites for moral development, a value too important to be slighted. Imagination (and fantasy) should be allowed to contribute what they can to the developmental processes. The most adequate means for moral growth cannot solely be the structure or formal properties, as Kohlberg argues. Some transformation of his theory and how it can be applied in the classroom is needed for the broader outlook the area of morality requires.

⁴⁴Jeffreys, p. 129.



CONCLUSION

Restatement of Purpose

For those who do find Kohlberg's approach too cold and calculating, and too neglectful of such non-cognitive features as habit, fantasy, unconscious drives and feelings, there has been a movement towards a more balanced and holistic approach towards moral education. Such a more integrated approach was advocated by this paper as a means by which successful moral education and integrated whole identities can be realized in the fullest sense possible.

I did not call for an abandonment of Kohlberg's theory, for his research is of inestimable value. I asked for a refocusing and a modification. We need to regard Kohlberg's theory as what it really is—just one among many with competing claims. We can make invaluable use of his worthy theory, but we must also look to alternative theories to supplement his theory's weaknesses and neglects. Such additional components as the ones I have proposed (content, habit, emotion, feeling, imagination) need not come into conflict with the components of Kohlberg's theory. They can enrich it, complement it and help to make his theory into one concerned with all aspects of moral development. These additional components can work in harmony with Kohlberg's existing cognitive components in forming a more complete theory of moral education.

Importance of Content and Habit

As James Gilligan's research helped to show, morality is content as well as form. We need to know both to fully comprehend what moral development is all about. One aspect of content, habit, is a very necessary and useful moral concept. It leaves us free to devote our energy (mental and physical) to a higher level of activity. Habit also helps resolve Peters' 'paradox of moral education', which states that during the child's most formative years, he is incapable of conducting himself rationally and intelligently. He cannot be taught rules in a rational way through such processes as explanation and persuasion since this depends on the more principled morality. By helping the child lay down a pattern of desired responses, by helping him cope and deal with long term, flexible goals and objectives, and by helping him become sensitive to considerations later to serve as principles, we can help him enter the 'Palace of Reason' through the courtyard of habit and content." Habituation does not just mean doing things 'out of habit'. It also involves habits, formed at different levels of life, conflicting and leading to a continual restructuring and adjustment, enabling them to remain a fresh and important part of morality. Utilizing Frankena's two-fold approach for successful moral education and prosocial behavior we can see the important role habit can play in developing dispositions that will lead the child not only into knowing what is right, but acting accordingly. Because his approach not only involves the formation of right ideas but also caring that what we do is

right, it makes a substantial place for emotion and feeling in a theory of moral development, another neglected feature of the Kohlberg school of thought.

Importance of Emotion and Feeling

Emotion and feeling have, in the past, been regarded as the disruptive forces in moral education, those which interfere with a person's operational thinking. Ignored was the belief that emotions can act so as to organize behavior by arousing, sustaining and directing it. They can be a force for stability. Emotion is a very necessary component for success in moral education. Prosocial behavior, such as altruism, relies heavily on the ability to identify and clarify feelings, not only in yourself but in others as well.

Such behavior is first accomplished by means of imitation of a positive adult model. The next step is to provide the child with opportunities for giving help and responsible care to others. The school can play an important role here in providing learning experiences (i.e. role taking opportunities).

Growth in moral development involves transformation of both cognitive and affective elements together. As our intellect develops, so do our emotions. They adjust to the increased cognitive capacity for viewing the world. Their absence could be the cause of the slippage that sometimes occurs between moral judgement and action. For a person to have a complete understanding of principles, concepts or judgements, he must possess the affective structure consistent with the cognitive structure.

John Wilson's treatise on the nature of reason claims that the use of reason is not opposed to feelings and emotions. Being reasonable consists in adjusting and assessing feelings and emotions according to certain principles. He believes this dispassionate examination of one's and others' feelings and attitudes is the essence of morality and it is what makes rationality in the moral sphere distinct from rationality in other spheres.

Moral development is mainly interested in 'active emotions' or 'emotional attitudes' which, because they are enduring tendencies, can influence a person's future behavior. They represent the interest needed to resolve a moral dilemma. These emotional attitudes involve a certain amount of memory of previous experience and some cognition and evaluation. Influencing and developing these 'active emotions' should be what we as teachers are interested in, and a necessary part of a school curriculum.

Developing appropriate affective behaviors is accomplished in much the same way as appropriate cognitive learning experiences. Specific goals and efforts need to be made. To be the most profitable cognitive and affective goals should be worked at simultaneously in order to achieve that fully integrated identity.

Depth of Content Through the Use of Imagination

One of the neglected components of Kohlberg's theory I have made argument for in this paper has been the importance of moral content in any theory of moral development. I think

there is ample moral justification for some basic rules. In fact I think it is a necessity, especially in early moral education. I have argued that for the good of society, children must become habituated to following certain rules for their protection as well as that of others. At this age they cannot yet grasp the rationale of a principle. These basic rules do not impede later development to a principled morality, but can form the basis for it and pave the way. Principles and abstractions must be based on something concrete. What type of habits we form at this stage can make all the difference in the world to our later morality.

Depth can be given to the function of content through the development of the imagination which can act as an integrative force. It can provide us with a tentative morality where we can test out and experiment, study the various consequences and alternatives without fear of commitment. Imagination can foster the growth of active habits. It can help in developing empathy. It can bring positive changes in self concept and interpersonal concepts. And because it is an individual process, we are forced into being personally responsible, and this in itself can aid in our growth of moral maturity. Once again this is a concept not mentioned in Kohlberg's theory and not only would it fit in with his theory but it is required by it. Kohlberg has placed a great deal of importance on role taking opportunities for progression through his moral stages.

Response to Kohlberg

Kohlberg's account of moral development is too onesided and limited because it is based on a limited interpretation of morality. Kohlberg states, "the conception that difficult moral choices are difficult because of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit and superego is misleading....real moral crises arise when situations are socially ambiguous, when the usual moral expectations break down."¹ As Alston points out, "there are certainly difficult moral situations of both kinds and it is only a kind of intellectual 'vested interest' that could lead to award only one of these kinds of situations the label of 'real moral crises.'"² There are obvious possibilities for alternative emphases in morality. The emphasis could be on encouraging children in sympathy, compassion, concern for others, etc.

A. S. Neill, the founder of Summerhill, an advocate for a prominent place for the role of emotions in a school curriculum writes, "To me education is primarily an affair of the emotions; not that one should try to educate the emotions; one can only make an environment in which emotions can be lived out and expressed."³

Although we still are not fully confident as to the

¹Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: the cognitive developmental approach to socialization," p. 231.

²Alston, p. 284.

³A. S. Neill, Talking of Summerhill (London: Gollanez, 1967), p. 133.

proper role of affective education, the wheels have been set in motion so that society's rationalistic, impersonal and dehumanizing tendencies can be held in check. The general theme for this study has been the importance of an integrated identity achieved through a more modified, broader conception of a moral theory than Kohlberg presents, through utilization of several forgotten or neglected components in his theory, and through the interpenetration or the intertwining of the cognitive and affective domains. The paper argued against any separation of the two on the grounds that it would create a distortion or falseness, as does the neglect of any of the other proposed important concepts of moral development. Although Lawrence Kohlberg's findings and research are of unquestionable importance, his system can have only limited significance for those interested in a more balanced theory of moral development; a development of the 'whole' person.

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